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I. INTRODUCTION: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REDISCOVERED
1
A specter is haunting the neo-classical theory of the corporation. It is the specter
that law matters-that a positive theory of the firm is incomplete unless it incorporates

* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. This paper was initially presented
at a conference sponsored by the University of Michigan Law School and the William Davidson Institute on
September 23 and 24, 1999. The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Bernard Black,
Melvin Eisenberg, Katharina Pistor, Andrei Shleifer, and the participants at the Michigan conference, including
in particular his commentators, Professors Andrew Weiss of Boston University and Ken Lehn of the University
of Pittsburgh. None bear any necessary responsibility, however, for the views expressed herein. All rights
reserved by the author. Copyright, John C. Coffee, Jr. 1999.
I. This reference is to a quotation from a now obscure 19th Century economist, Karl Marx, who coined
the phrase in 1848. See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (Int'l
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and explains the role of legal variables. Recent research on corporate governance has
found systematic differences among nations in ownership concentration, capital market
development, the value of voting rights, and the use of external finance. 2 More
importantly, these differences seem to correlate closely with the strength of the legal
protections given minority investors. 3 In turn, this level of legal protection seems to
depend upon, and vary systematically with, the nature and origins of each nation's legal
system. In particular, common law legal systems seem to vastly outperform civil law
legal systems (and particularly French civil law systems) in providing investor
protections and, in turn, encouraging capital market growth and ownership dispersion.
Most importantly, this new scholarship has found that the size, depth, and liquidity of
securities markets correlates directly with the quality of the legal protections given to

shareholders. 4 In consequence, because the nature and quality of legal protection differs
widely across nations, the corporate world subdivides today into rival systems of
dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership, with different structures of corporate
5
governance characterizing each.
A paradigm shift is now underway in the manner in which financial economics

views corporate governance, with the new scholarship emphasizing both the centrality of
legal protections for minority shareholders and the possibility that regulation can

outperform private contracting. 6 Although this Article recognizes the importance of this
transition, it is far more skeptical about whether this new scholarship has identified the
critical elements that have given the "common law" nations a comparative advantage
over the "civil law" world. Here, a mystery remains. One possibility is that substantive
differences in corporate law may matter far less than differences in enforcement practice.
In turn, enforcement may depend more upon the strength of the incentives to assert legal
remedies than upon the availability of legal remedies themselves. Even this hypothesis,
however, oversimplifies, because once one examines closely the differences among
various systems of corporate governance, the assumed homogeneity of even common law

Publishers 1948) (observing that the specter of Communism was haunting Europe). Younger scholars are not
expected to be familiar with this material.
2. The principal efforts have been by four financial economists, writing jointly, called by some "the Gang
of Four," but hereafter referred to more neutrally as "LLS&V." See. e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, and Andrei Shleifer, CorporateOwnership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); La Porta, Lopezde-Silanos, Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); La Porta, Lopez-deSilanos, Shleifer & Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997). For another
provocative effort in this same vein, see Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial
Crisis, 1997-1998 (Jan. 1999) (working paper, on file with author).
3. For the latest commentary by LLS&V on this theme, see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanos, Shleifer &
Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance (June 1999) (working paper, on file with author).
4. See sources cited supra notes 2 and 3.
5. Although these systems may seem static, individual firms can migrate from one to the other,
principally by listing on a stock exchange in a "dispersed ownership" nation. I have suggested elsewhere that
such migration and the need for global scale is destabilizing the traditional concentrated ownership system. See
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospectsfor Global Convergence in Corporate Governance
and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1999).
6. Financial economics, as a field, has long been skeptical of regulation. For an indication that this
attitude is changing, see, e.g., Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, Coase v. The Coasians: The Regulation and
Development of Securities Markets in Poland and the Czech Republic (Sept. 1999) (working paper, on file with
author).

Privatizationand CorporateGovernance

1999]

legal systems begins to break down. Another possibility is that differences in substantive
corporate law are less important than the differences in the level of regulation that
7
different nations impose on their securities markets. Under this latter hypothesis, the
focus shifts from the minority shareholder to the investor generally. The critical question
becomes: Does local law establish adequate disclosure and market transparency
standards, restrict insider trading, and regulate takeovers and corporate control contests
adequately? If it does, then arguably the exposure of shareholders to unfair self-dealing
transactions at the corporate level may have only a second-level significance. This Article
finds considerable evidence in the Polish and Czech experiences to be consistent with this
hypothesis. Inadequate securities regulation plays the primary role in explaining
privatization failures, but the Article also finds some evidence to suggest that deficiencies
in Czech corporate law contributed to the systematic looting of Czech companies by their
controlling shareholders.
Even if the critical protections upon which minority shareholders depend have not
yet been clearly identified, the available data still strongly support the interpretation that
law matters; that in some not yet well-understood manner, certain legal systems have
encouraged dispersed ownership, while other systems have rendered it an unstable and
transient phenomenon. This new emphasis on legal variables has potentially subversive
implications for at least some aspects of neo-classical corporate finance theory. Much of
the modem "law and economics" literature on corporate governance has assumed that
financial market regulation was unnecessary and that the role of corporate law was
simply to offer a model form contract to investors to enable them to economize on
contracting costs. This conclusion that regulation was superfluous (or worse) rested on
twin premises: (1) sophisticated parties could write financial contracts that were far more
detailed, sophisticated, and fine-tuned to their specific circumstances than any body of
standardized regulations could hope to be, 8 and (2) entrepreneurs had adequate incentives
to minimize agency costs (in part by bonding themselves and otherwise limiting their
discretion) in order to maximize the value for their stock when they brought their
fledgling firm to the capital markets. 9 In short, because, under the standard Jensen and
Meckling model of the firm,10 entrepreneurs bore the weight of agency costs, they had
good reason to surrender any discretion to expropriate wealth from their investors and to
bond themselves to serve their shareholders faithfully; hence, regulation seemed
best by
unnecessary. From this perspective, the survival of regulation could be explained
11
rent-seeking.
and
groups
interest
about
theories
choice
reference to public

7. This possibility was first implicitly noted in Coffee, supra note 5, and has been explicitly advanced in
convincing detail by Katharina Pistor. See Katharina Pistor, Law as a Determinant for Equity Market
Development: The Experience of Transition Economies (Mar. 1999) (working paper, on file with author).
8. Essentially, the sentence in the text is a very short summary of the arguments advanced by Judge
Easterbrook and Dean Fischel for why much corporate and securities regulation is unnecessary. See FRANK
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). For an earlier
statement of this view, see George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 37 J. BuS. 117 (1964).
9. See Michael Jensen e- William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs,
and Ownership Structure,3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
10. Id.

11.

For well-known such efforts, see Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Toward An Interest-Group

Theory of Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of
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This claim that financial contracting largely renders regulation irrelevant cannot
explain, however, the close correlation between a given country's level of capital market
development and the nature of its legal system. The more logical conclusion is that law
does matter, and regulation can somehow better promote economic efficiency than can
reliance on financial contracting alone. By themselves, private contracting and the
voluntary incentives for disclosure seem incapable of producing the level of continuing
disclosure necessary to sustain active securities markets.
More importantly, standard economic models of financial contracting within firms
do not fit the privatization context. Chiefly, this is because privatized firms do not evolve
over time from smaller firms, beginning with the usual incubation period at the venture
capital stage and progressing through the initial public offering, but instead are created
Minerva-like by governmental fiat. Typically, voucher privatization (which has been the
preferred technique) simply distributes shares (or coupons to purchase shares) to all or
most of the adult citizens in the country. Dispersed ownership is more transient and
vulnerable in this context, because it arrives overnight at the outset of the firm's
existence. Hence, managers neither contract with shareholders nor pledge a reputational
capital that they have carefully built up over years of service; rather, managers and
shareholders are thrown together as legal strangers. 12
This point has important implications for a policy debate that has begun among
scholars who have studied the transitional process: Should privatization be "fast" or
"slow"? 13 Should policymakers adopt a "Damn the torpedoes, full speed
ahead"
approach that accepts the inevitability of some overreaching by controlling shareholders,
but justifies this cost as necessary to realize and expedite the efficiency gains incident to
privatization? Or should privatization proceed more cautiously because of the risks of
market failure and political corruption that may result when control seekers are tempted
to bribe and seduce the judicial and regulatory systems to achieve the private benefit of
control? These tempting private benefits arise, of course, precisely to the extent that
privatization preceded the creation of an adequate legal foundation. The cases examined
in this Article illustrate this tension and lead it to favor a prudential course of phased
privatization, which does not make a hasty and potentially corrupting scramble to control
the likely consequence of creating a dispersed ownership structure.
This Article will proceed through four stages. Part II examines some of the
difficulties in attempting to distinguish common law from civil law systems in terms of
any critical factors that lead one to outperform the other. Part III then focuses on the
Czech and Polish experiences, along with earlier, more tentative efforts at privatization,
in order to understand what has chiefly gone wrong. Part IV focuses on the techniques

State of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. I I (1987); Jonathan Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence
and Interest Group Formation:A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 909 (1994).
12. Neo-classical economic theory views the firm as a "nexus of contracts." See Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 9., at 310-311. Yet privatization often short-circuits this contracting process by simply creating a dispersed
shareholder base. A stable equilibrium is thus not reached. The result is that the shareholders have less-welldefined legal rights and are more vulnerable to opportunistic actions by those in control.
13. For examples of this new critique of "fast" privatization, see John Nellis, Time to Rethink Privatization
in Transitional Economies?, FIN. & DEV., June 1999, at 16, 16-19; BERNARD BLACK ET AL. RUSSIAN
PRIVATIZATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? (Stanford Law School Working Paper
No. 178, 1999).
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recently used for expropriating value from privatized firms and suggests that these
techniques reveal some deficiencies in the corporate governance norms of civil law
systems. Finally, Part V suggests functional reforms and priorities, but these proposals
will not give primary emphasis to specific doctrinal rules. Indeed, their premise will be
that wholesale adoption of U.S. or U.K. legal rules is not feasible and might not be
effective in any event.
II. ARE COMMON LAW SYSTEMS HOMOGENOUS?
The new comparative research on corporate governance has found that some legal
systems give minority shareholders greater protection from fraud and expropriation than
others and has assumed that the critical differences largely inhere in the statutory law of
these rival systems. 14 This assumes, however, what is to be proven. For example,
differences in substantive law could be far less important than differences in enforcement
practice. But once we focus on enforcement practice, a blunt, but overlooked, truth
quickly confronts us: Common law legal systems may not be that much alike. Thus,
while it has been an implicit premise of this new learning that the U.S. and the U.K., as
the two leading common law systems and the two leading economies characterized by
dispersed share ownership, are highly similar, this premise is very debatable. To be sure,
both systems share a common legal history. But to stop at this point is to ignore volumes
of more recent and highly relevant history over which their two paths have diverged. For
much of the late 19th Century "Robber Baron" era in the United States, controlling
shareholders regularly overreached and plundered minority shareholders and creditors.
Colorful rogues-such as Jay Gould, Jim Fisk, and Daniel Drew-regularly manipulated
the market and perfected the legal technology for "watering" the stock of minority
shareholders. 15 Meanwhile, these predators battled for control of railroad empires against
even more imperious barons, such as Commodore Vanderbilt, with each side buying and
corrupting local judges. 16 Much of this era seems to have been recently replayed in
Russia and Central Europe. Throughout this 19th Century era, the common law proved a
frail reed upon which minority shareholders could not safely rely. Over time, investment
bankers (most notably, the House of Morgan) and the New York Stock Exchange brought
some semblance of law and order to this Wild West environment, and legal standards
14. See sources cited supra notes 2 and 3. LLS&V run regression analyses that rank the minority
protections given shareholders in different countries in terms of the presence (or absence) of certain specified
statutory protections and then relate these rankings to the size of each country's securities market. While they
find a strong relationship between weak protections and weak markets, such studies remain vulnerable to the
problem of multicollinearity (that is, the true predictive variable may escape detection because it was not tested
in the sample but overlapped with the independent variable that seems to show predictive power). For example,
a statutory provision that seems to show predictive power may overlap with a softer and untested factor (such as
a strong and independent judiciary). Necessarily, empiricists measure the data that is available, and in the case
of "softer" variables (such as judicial style and judicial independence), little data is available. Hence, these
softer variables may be ignored.
15. Gould, Fisk, and Drew engaged in a famous battle with Commodore Vanderbilt for control of the Erie
Railroad. When Vanderbilt sought to buy control by acquiring Erie's shares in the open market, his three
antagonists used their control over the Erie board to dump an endless stream of watered stock on the market.
Both sides bribed judges and state legislators. See MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 80-86
(1986); cf. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 447-48 (1973).

16. See Klein, supra note 15, at 80-86.
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(particularly those applicable to stock issues and fiduciary standards) were consciously
tightened by courts and state legislatures. Still, as of 1900, little suggested that
shareholders in the United States received greater protection than shareholders in, say,
France.
Another aspect of this puzzle emerges if we look at the legal system in
contemporary Russia. Although the Russian legal environment seems even closer to the
Hobbesian state of nature with the looting of corporations and financial institutions being
a fairly common event, Russian corporate law has largely borrowed (in a simplified
17
fashion) the principal features and protections of U.S. and U.K. corporate law.
Apparently, expropriation can occur even when the law "on the books" is nearly optimal.
Perhaps this should not surprise us, as the legal realists have taught us for most of the
20th Century that the "law on the books" is often different from, and less important than,
the "law in practice."
One likely answer to this puzzle of when law matters (and why) may lie in the
hypothesis that what really counts is not the content of the substantive law, but the
adequacy of the enforcement mechanisms that underlie it.18 The concept of enforcement
mechanism needs, however, to be understood in a broader sense than simply the
availability of specific legal remedies. For example, the one characteristic that the Robber
Baron era in the United States shares with contemporary Russia is that in both, the central
government was weak and largely unable to enforce its commands in outlying areas. In
the late 19th Century, the federal government in the United States was almost powerless
to control private business entities; no centralized body (such as the SEC) had jurisdiction
over investor protection, and business rivals could establish strong political fiefdoms in
one state and largely ignore the commands of judges in a different state. In contemporary
Russia, the central government appears similarly unable to control local provincial
administrators, who may confiscate or extort assets from corporations operating in their
area of effective control. 19
If we focus on enforcement, however, it immediately becomes clear that the
differences between the U.S. and the U.K. are probably as great as between the U.S. and
France (a nation generally thought to enforce its investor protection laws only weakly). In
the U.S., class and derivative actions are permitted, and plaintiffs' attorneys may charge
contingent fees, which are usually awarded by the court based on a percentage of the
recovery that the attorney obtains for the class. Under the standard "American Rule,"
each side bears its own legal fees (which means that the plaintiffs attorney faces only the
17. Russian company law has borrowed heavily from U.S. and U.K. sources and, in its current version,
was heavily influenced by a model developed by two American law professors. See Bernard Black & Reinier
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of CorporateLaw, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911 (1996).
18. There is already some empirical support for this modest revision of the LLS&V thesis. See infra notes
87-90 and accompanying text.
19. For example, the foreign (and largely institutional) shareholders of Far Eastern Shipping Company,
Russia's largest commercial shipping line, have protested that the provincial governor of Vladivostok objected
to their large ownership stake (42%) in Far Eastern and demanded that they surrender 7% of their shares to him.
Otherwise, he allegedly threatened to reduce their voting rights by provincial decree. See Neela Banerjee,
Shareholders Charge Extortion in Russian Far East, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1999, at C3. For a discussion of
other instances in which regional barons and local political groups have extorted value from foreign investors in
privatized Russian firms, see Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Lessons from Fiascos in Russian Corporate
Governance (Sept. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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loss of time and expenses invested in the action if the action is unsuccessful and is not
20
generally liable for the winner's legal expenses). In the U.K., the reverse is generally
true. Class actions and contingent fees are not authorized, and the losing side must
normally compensate the winning side for its expenses. When the individual plaintiff
sues the large corporate defendant, the latter will likely incur the larger legal fees, and
this disproportion logically turns the prospect of fee-shifting under the English rule into a
prohibitive deterrent to litigation. As a result, while in the United States a highly
entrepreneurial system of private enforcement has evolved that largely overcomes the
21
nothing
collective action problems that dissuade individual investors from suing,
comparable exists in the United Kingdom.
Another sharp contrast involves the level of judicial activism in the two countries.
For common law systems to behave similarly, it would seem logically necessary for them
to accord a similar role to the judge. But it is not clear that they do. Although the U.S.
and the U.K. share a common law tradition, judges in these two systems appear to behave
quite differently. Comparative law scholars rate U.S. courts near the top of the scale in
terms of "judicial daring"-that is, the willingness of judges to create new legal rules in
22
the absence of legislation-but place the U.K. near the bottom of this same scale. In
short, the more that one looks at the supposedly obvious differences between common
law and civil law countries, the more that those differences begin to blur.
On the other hand, the U.K. has other institutions-most notably, its Takeover
Panel-which appear to be highly effective and which lack any close parallel in the
United States. In general, takeover defensive tactics are much more restricted in the U.K.
than in the U.S. Finally, given the more concentrated character of the British financial
community (both in terms of institutional ownership and physical location in the City of
London), reputational effects may matter more in the U.K. than in the U.S. These
differences may be important, but they have little to do with the line between the
common law and the civil law.
The point here is not to compare the enforcement mechanisms of the U.S. and the
U.K., but only to indicate that they may be very different. In turn, this implies a
conceptual problem with the new academic research that broadly and boldly contrasts
common law countries with civil law countries. Although real differences are clearly
observable in terms of ownership concentration, the depth of markets, and the value of
control, the presumed legal homogeneity of either common law or civil law countries
may be more illusory than real. For example, many of those substantive legal rules that
the U.S. and the U.K. share may have only trivial significance (or may have importance

20. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) ("In the United States,
the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser.").
21. This is not to claim that the U.S. system is optimal. Class actions could in principle result in overdeterrence; conversely, the availability of liability insurance could nullify the legal threat. But at least one can
understand why such legal remedies might create socially desirable deterrence.
22. For a survey of comparative law scholars who rated U.S. courts as second in "judicial daring" (after
Israel) and U.K. courts as third from last (out of fourteen industrialized countries), see Robert Cooter & Tom
Ginsburg, ComparativeJudicialDiscretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
295, 300 (1996). Professors Cooter and Ginsburg suggest that differences in political structure and the role of
dominant political parties best explain these national differences. See id. at 296-300.

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Fall

in one legal system and not the other 23). Thus, to return to a distinction that I have made
in earlier work, formal legal convergence may be less important than functional
convergence. 24 Although the U.S. and the U.K. (and other common law countries) have
similar legal systems that share a common origin, their common history may be less
important than the fact that they have developed quite different mechanisms for dealing
with the same "agency cost" problems that in the end achieve functionally similar results.
For example, the issuance of a materially false financial statement may cause a
significant drop in the company's stock price upon its discovery in both nations. In the
U.S., it may elicit a class action; in the U.K., institutional investors may protest to the
board and demand corrective action. However, in both countries, responsible senior
management may lose their jobs in consequence over about the same period. Similarly, in
both countries, a chief executive officer whose company's stock price and earnings
underperform the industry averages for a given number of successive quarters will likely
be removed from office-although the mechanism of removal (a board coup d'etat or a
25
hostile takeover) may differ between the two countries.
In short, the danger in focusing on legal commonality is that it may obscure very
different functional mechanisms that are in fact more responsible for the similar
ownership structure and market characteristics of two economies. Also, the recent
research on comparative corporate governance has largely focused on the firm level,
examining specific characteristics of corporate and bankruptcy law that were thought to
generate higher levels of investor protection in "common law" legal systems. Although
important, this focus slights the importance of securities markets themselves. The one
feature that the U.S. and the U.K. clearly share is strong securities markets, with high
disclosure and transparency standards. Rather than attribute the strength of these markets
to the alleged commonality of U.S. and U.K. corporate law, it may make more sense to
look at the even clearer commonality of U.S. and U.K. securities law. 26 Their similar
listing, disclosure, and corporate governance standards may be more important in
producing functional convergence (at least for larger companies) than the legal remedies
available to individual shareholders. Nonetheless, the indicators used by LLS&V 27 in
their provocative comparisons of common law and civil law systems have largely focused
on the corporate level and ignored the differences in securities market regulation. 28 Not

23. Preemptive rights, for example, play an important role in constraining managements in the U.K., but
almost no role in the United States. See Bernard Black & John Coffee, Hail Britannia?:Institutional Investor
Behavior Under Limited Regulation,92 MICH. L. REv. 1997, 2079 (1994).
24. See Coffee, supranote 5, at 679-80.
25. Indeed, this is what several empirical studies seem to show about practices across the leading
industrial nations. See Steven Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance:A Comparison of Japan
and the U.S., 102 J. POL. ECON. 510 (1994); Steven Kaplan, Top Executive Turnover and Firm Performancein
Germany, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 142 (1994).
26. It is noteworthy, for example, that the Securities Act of 1933 was modeled after the earlier English
Companies Act of 1900, which ironically was, itself, intended to reverse the common law's tolerance for fraud.
For a discussion of the different philosophies underlying the Securities Act of 1933 and the eventual triumph of
a disclosure philosophy over a more regulatory philosophy, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE

FINANCE 39-42 (1982).
27. See La Porta et al., Corporate OwnershipAround the World, supra note 2.
28. This point has been earlier emphasized by Pistor. See Pistor, supra note 7.
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only have the differences among nations in securities regulation been material, but
equally important, international convergence is today proceeding more rapidly at the
securities market level than at the corporate level. 29 Indeed, functional convergence
among securities markets seems more attainable than formal legal convergence at the
corporate law level, both because large firms can migrate between markets and because
securities markets themselves face global competitive pressures that may lead them to
change and adapt, even when their national governments are resistant to change.
Much recent comparative corporate governance research has been focused on
reform. In particular, the recent comparative studies seem to have come as a natural
progression from the earlier efforts (and frustrations) of many of these same scholars in
attempting to implement viable corporate governance systems in transitional economies
that were just emerging from their socialist cocoons. That experience quickly showed two
strong tendencies: first, securities markets are fragile and could collapse, and second,
expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders could (and did) occur on a
massive scale. The response of some scholars to this experience has largely been to call
for legislative reform to implement the principal features of the "common law" systems.
Such reform may be desirable, but calls for legislative reform or formal legal change
often go unheeded. In a path-dependent world, it may simply be politically impossible to
get from here to there, even when it is clear to most that such a transition would be
efficient and would yield significant economic growth.
III.

FALLACIES AND BLUNDERS: A SHORT HISTORY OF MASS PRIVATIZATION

In 1995, the Prague Stock Exchange had 1716 listings. 30 Blessed with relatively low
inflation and nearly full employment, the Czech Republic's strong macroeconomic
position made it seem the country in Central or Eastern Europe most likely to make a
smooth transition into a market-oriented economy. Yet by early 1999, the number of
listings on the Prague Stock Exchange had fallen by more than 80% to 301, and observers
estimated that fewer than a dozen of these enjoyed any liquidity. 3 1 Correspondingly, over
the same period, the value of an investment in an index of the leading 50 stocks on the
Prague Stock Exchange fell by over 60%.32 Trading dried up, and the viability of the
Prague Stock Exchange was itself threatened. Where there had been 1486 brokers in
33
1997, there were only 358 in mid-1999.
What happened? The fundamental fallacy in Czech privatization was that securities
markets would develop spontaneously, simply because voucher privatization would
create an initially dispersed ownership structure. By widely distributing the stock in
privatized companies to a broad segment of the Czech adult population, Czech planners
29. See Coffee, supranote 5, at 663-76.
30. See Peter S. Green, Prague Exchange's Failed Reform Efforts Leaves Some PredictingIts Demise,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 17, 1999, at 16.
31. Id. It must be acknowledged that the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE), itself, delisted many of these
companies and imposed higher listing standards during this period as part of its struggle to survive. See Pistor,
supra note 7. At the outset of Czech privatization, there were no real listing standards, and the vast majority of
privatized companies were listed. Still, the decision to delist these stocks was not truly voluntary. Their
continued trading on the PSE would likely have left that market without any credibility.
32. Green, supranote 30, at 16. Specifically, the PX-50 index fell from 1000 to 371.
33. Id.
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expected that an active secondary market would develop naturally. The militantly laissezfaire attitude of the initial Czech government also made it highly resistant to any
regulation of this market.
In fact, for an initial period of high optimism, which lasted into 1995, share prices
did rise. But then, after a series of scandals, the Czech bubble began to burst. First,
foreign portfolio investors began to flee the Czech market. Foreign direct and portfolio
investment dropped from $103 million in 1995 to $57 million in 1996 and then turned
35
negative in 1997. 34 By 1998, the Czech economy entered a general recession. In its
wake, momentum gathered to reform the Czech securities market, and reform legislation
was adopted in 1998 that established a Czech SEC and curbed some of the more
egregious abuses.
Behind this massive disinvestment in the Czech market lay a pervasive loss of
investor confidence, as small, dispersed owners witnessed widespread looting of Czech
investment funds and the systematic exploitation of the remaining minority shareholders
in Czech fi-rms once any faction acquired a controlling position. In consequence, small
shareholders systematically divested their shares and moved savings to other forms of
investment. At the outset of mass privatization in the Czech Republic, over seven million
but by 1999, the number
Czech citizens purchased shares through voucher privatization,
36
million."
five
"barely
to
fallen
had
shareholders
of Czech
If the Czech experience then seems a paradigm of a market failure caused by
inadequacies in the legal system, it is still important to identify what precisely went
wrong. After a period of initial optimism, investors clearly lost confidence in the Czech
market, causing it to decline sharply, even though the underlying macroeconomic
conditions remained relatively stable on a regional basis. Moreover, the apparent Czech
failure contrasts sharply with the experience of neighboring Poland, where the
privatization process was slower and where stronger disclosure and governance standards
were established as preconditions. This section will therefore move from a brief review of
this seemingly natural experiment to a more detailed assessment of what differentiated
these two efforts and then a broader look at other privatization programs.
A. Poland Versus the Czech Republic: Divergent Approaches to Privatization
In geopolitical terms, Poland and the Czech Republic share much in common, as
similar Central European countries with a common Slavic culture and a common
historical experience as former members of the Soviet bloc. But their approaches to
privatization could not have been more divergent. The Czech Republic rushed into
privatization in the early 1990s, with regulatory controls being developed on an ex post
basis in response to a series of crises and scandals. 37 Determined to move assets into the
34. See Current Aspects of the Czech Capital Market, Czech Ministry of Finance (internal report dated
1997).
35. Czech GDP contracted by more than 2.5% in 1998 (whereas neighboring countries experienced a 45% annual growth). See Nellis, supra note 13, at 16-19.
36. Green, supra note 30.
37. 1have discussed the contrasting experiences of these two nations at greater length elsewhere. See John
C. Coffee, Jr., Inventing a Corporate Monitor for TransitionalEconomies The Uncertain Lessons from the
Czech and Polish Experiences, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND
EMERGING RESEARCH 67, 122-25 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
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private sector as quickly as possible, Czech authorities privatized some 1491 joint stock
companies in the first wave of Czech privatization, and another 861 in the second wavethereby increasing the private sector share of Czech Gross Domestic Product from 12%
in 1990 to 74% by 1996.38 In fairness, this was a considerable logistical achievement.
In contrast, Poland moved far more slowly and equivocally, privatizing only some
500 firms and only pursuant to a procedure that assigned a state-created investment fund
as the controlling shareholder of each privatized firm. Rather than assuming that a
secondary market would develop spontaneously, Poland designed voucher investment
funds as a mechanism to solve the perceived powerlessness of the individual shareholder
in a mass privatization program. To assure that these state-created investment funds
would control the privatized firms, Poland neither permitted the creation of private
investment funds (which had sprung up overnight in the Czech Republic) nor initially
allowed citizens to invest directly in the stock of the newly privatized firms. Rather,
Polish law mandated that citizens could invest their voucher certificates only in statecreated financial intermediaries, known as National Investment Funds (NIFs), which
were to serve as controlling shareholders of the to-be-privatized firms. 3 9 At the outset,
only 15 NIFs were chartered, with each being assigned a controlling 33-1/3% stake in its
share of the 500 privatized firms. The balance of the stock in each firm was held by other
NIFs and by the state. Each NIF then hired a management company to advise on
restructuring those companies in which the NIF held a controlling stake; in fact, a number
of Western investment banking firms were hired to perform this role, sometimes in
preference to Polish commercial banks.
In short, viewing continued state ownership as the greater danger, Czech authorities
rushed into privatization and gave relatively little attention to problems of regulation,
while in Poland state planners took the reverse view of the relative dangers, and therefore
moved slowly and cautiously to implement a limited privatization program that
effectively substituted state-created monitors (in which citizens could invest) for direct
state ownership.
Some results of these two very different approaches were easily predictable: the
Czech Republic quickly developed an active securities market, while the Polish securities
market developed haltingly with only very thin trading (which actually declined between
1994 and 1996).4o In the Czech Republic, private investment funds appeared as a
spontaneous, unplanned market development, with over 600 funds being formed during
the two Czech privatization waves. Necessarily, these funds could only be regulated on
an after-the-fact basis. In contrast, in Poland, privatization was delayed repeatedly by

38. See Saul Estrin et al., The Impact of Privatization Funds on Corporate Governance in Mass
Privatization Schemes: The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia, in THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATIZATION
FUNDS: EXPERIENCES OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, POLAND AND SLOVENIA 137, 142 (Marko Simoneti et al. eds.,
1999).
39. For a detailed description of the NIF, which essentially resembled closed-end mutual funds and were
created by the Polish Ministry of State Treasury to hold controlling stakes in privatized firms, see Jannsa
Lewandowski & Roman Szyszko, The Governance of PrivatizationFunds in Poland,in THE GOVERNANCE OF
PRIVATIZATION FUNDS, supra note 38.
40. See Eva Thiel, The Development of Securities Markets in TransitionalEconomies: Policy Issues and
Country Experience, 70 FIN. MARKET TRENDS 111 (June 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws
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political infighting over a variety of issues, including selection of the management
companies that would run the NIFs.
Both systems encountered serious problems, but of a very different character. Three
distinct problems compromised Czech privatization, and each was at bottom attributable
to legal failures. First, and most noticeable, was the near total lack of transparency in the
Czech securities market. Because trading was not centralized and trading off the Prague
Stock Exchange did not require contemporaneous price reporting, only the prices of those
transactions that the trading participants wished to disclose (and so transacted on the
Exchange) were reported. In fact, it appears that the majority of all trading transactions
occurred off the Prague Stock Exchange, 4 1 with the minority of transactions that did
occur on the exchange being widely thought to have been at inflated prices. In effect,
current securities prices were revealed only when the traders wanted to post a priceeither to influence western portfolio investors or inflate the value of a privatization fund's
portfolio. For this and other reasons, including the absence during this period of any
SEC-like authority with power to regulate trading or require contemporaneous price
disclosure, foreign investors quickly grew skeptical that the reported prices on the Prague
Stock Exchange reflected real values. Moreover, in this non-transparent world, informed
trading predictably flourished because it was more profitable than in an efficient
42
market.
A second problem quickly arose that further compromised restructuring efforts.
During the course of the two Czech privatization waves, some six hundred investment
funds were created, and they competed vigorously to convince individual investors to
convert their privatization vouchers into their shares. Potentially, such vehicles could
have become effective corporate monitors because they aggregated large stakes in Czech
corporations and thereby potentially solved the collective action problem that the
dispersed ownership resulting from voucher privatization necessarily implied. However,
the largest investment funds were established by the principal Czech commercial and
savings banks, which had obvious reputational advantages in convincing Czech citizens
to deposit their vouchers with them. 43 Owning only small stakes in their own investment
funds, the banks had little incentive to undertake costly restructuring activities. Instead,
many sought to use their investment fund's influence over its portfolio companies to
secure banking clients for themselves. Rather than concentrating their holdings (and thus
maximizing their influence), most bank-administered funds sought to diversify their
holdings in order to hold stakes in as many firms as possible-in part to solicit banking

41. According to Thiel, only 3% of actual trades were executed on the Prague Stock Exchange. See Thiel,
supra note 40, at 111. In part, this was attributable to the existence of a Nasdaq-like alternative system, which
also disclosed prices contemporaneously. Still, investment funds could trade on a face-to-face basis off the
exchange and use the exchange only for transactions at inflated prices.
42. Emerging markets appear in general to have very different characteristics from mature, efficient
markets. In particular, stocks in emerging markets exhibit strong "momentum," meaning that one period's
performance tends to predict the next period's performance; also, high beta stocks do not outperform low beta
stocks. See K. Geert Rouwenhorst, Local Return Factors and Turnover in Emerging Markets, 54 J. FIN. 1439,
1441 (1999).
43. Of the 13 largest investment funds in the first wave of Czech privatization, II were created by
financial institutions. See Saul Estrin et al., supra note 38, at 151. This was probably predictable, because
citizens were already familiar with the local savings, commercial, or postal banks that sponsored these funds.
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clients for their parents. 44 Also, to protect their banking parents from potential hostile
takeovers, the bank-run funds cross-invested heavily in the common stocks of the other
major banks and in that of their own banking parent. An incestuous web of crossownership quickly developed to insulate the major banks from hostile takeovers. Finally,
most privatization funds (both bank-related funds and non-bank funds) found it more
profitable to concentrate on trading than on restructuring often-inefficient portfolio
companies. The combination of a non-transparent market and their privileged position as
insiders made such activities profitable, but constantly filled the media with news of
recurring insider trading scandals.
If the bank-related funds were passive, the non-bank funds were far worse. A
subsequent study by the Czech Ministry of Finance found a negative correlation between
a privatized firm's performance and the percentage of its shares held by non-bank
investment funds. 4 5 In the first wave of Czech privatization, 3% of the funds became
insolvent and were placed into "forced administration," 46 but, in the second wave, the
rate of insolvency accelerated, and some ten funds accounting for over 21% of market
capitalization in that wave were placed in "forced administration." 47 The common cause
appears not to have been excessive leverage or investment failures, but "tunneling out"the fraudulent siphoning off of assets.
The ease with which funds could be looted is shown by the similar ease with which
they could escape regulation. Although Czech law did regulate the operation of
investment funds, it did not restrict the ability of an investment fund to elect to deregister
and become an unregulated holding company. Symptomatic of the civil law's literal
narrow-mindedness, the difference between an investment company and a holding
company under Czech law was formal, not functional. Simply by surrendering one's
license to operate as an investment company, an investment fund could escape virtually
all regulation. Because share ownership of investment companies was extremely
dispersed, a small control group, holding as little as 10% of the voting stock of an
investment fund, could usually dominate shareholder meetings and pass a resolution to
convert the fund into a holding company. Once unregulated, all forms of self-dealing
were effectively made possible, and the entity might reincorporate outside the Czech
Republic (as some did).
The extent of such conversions seems extraordinary. In terms of market share, fully
28% of the investment privatization funds in the first wave of Czech privatization and
21% of the funds in the second wave were converted into unregulated holding
companies. 48 Although this may sound as if the rate of conversion declined, it must be
remembered that an additional 21% of the funds in the second wave were placed in

44. Other motivations can also explain this failure to concentrate holdings (which continued in secondary
market trading as well as in the original privatization auctions). For example, in non-transparent markets,
trading in the stocks of newly privatized firms may be highly profitable for informed traders with seats on the
boards of their portfolio company.
45. See Czech Ministry of Finance, supranote 34.
46. See Jozef Koterba et al., The Governance of Privatization Funds in the Czech Republic, in THE
GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATIZATION FUNDS, supra note 38, at 7, 29-30.
47.

Id.

48. Id. at 30.
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"forced administration" by the Czech authorities. 49 On this basis, nearly half of the funds
in the second wave of Czech privatization either failed or escaped regulation by
converting into unregulated entities. Although major bank-run funds generally stood
apart from this race to convert, the banks' motives, while non-fraudulent, seemed to have
been in part to use their funds as vehicles by which to attract banking clients and other
business for themselves.
The eventual upshot of these repeated scandals was that the administration of
investment funds became a contentious political issue in the Czech Republic and helped
result in the downfall of the Vaclav Klaus Government (which had generally opposed
market regulation) and the passage of reform securities legislation in 1998. But by then,
50
public confidence in the securities market had been largely eroded.
The Polish experience was in many respects the reverse of the Czech experience.
Privatization was delayed and delayed again, as demanding disclosure rules and fiduciary
standards for directors were drafted. Polish citizens were given only one choice: which
NIF (of the fifteen originally created) to invest in, as direct investment in either portfolio
firms or private investment funds was not initially permitted. Trading was centralized on
the Warsaw Stock Exchange, and price transparency appears never to have been a serious
issue. Polish disclosure standards also won high marks from most observers, and the
EBRD Transition Report rated Poland and Hungary as the two Central European
51
countries that had most closely approximated IOSCO standards.
Still, while the Polish authorities planned a carefully integrated program of market
reforms and privatization, their success in actually developing their securities market
arguably presents a closer question. Advocates of "fast" privatization might point to the
fact that, as of late 1998, only some 253 companies were listed on the Warsaw Stock
Exchange 52 (much less than the number in the considerably smaller Czech Republic).
Indeed, the Polish mass privatization program was limited to some 500 enterprises,
representing only 10% of Polish Gross Domestic Product. 53 Similarly, while it remains
debatable whether the state-created financial intermediaries in Poland (the NIFs) have
functioned as effective monitors, some commentators believe the NIFs have at least been
54
more active than the Czech investment funds in encouraging efficient restructuring.
49. Id.
50. For a similar assessment that emphasizes the "very visible exploitation of opportunities for wealth
creation by collusion and arbitrage," see Thiel, supra note 40, at I11.
51. See EBRD Transition Report, Nov. 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. The EBRD
Transition Report evaluates the progress of transitional economies toward a free market system in a variety of
different areas (e.g., banking, bankruptcy, and securities market reforms) using a common 5-point index rating
system. In 1998, it awarded Poland a rating of 3+ (and the Czech Republic a rating of 3) for their efforts at
securities market reform.
52. See Securities Commission Head Displeased with 1998, PAP News Wire (Poland), Dec. 28, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
53. See Marko Simoneti & Paul Estrin, Introduction, in THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVATIZATION FUNDS,
supra note 38, at 1, 5; see also EBRD Transition Report, supra note 51. On the other hand, the Polish securities
markets have been able to support at least some IPOs. In 1997, Polish IPOs issued stock having a value equal to
1% of Polish GDP. Id.
54. These commentators have argued that only in Poland did the investment privatization funds acquire
sufficiently large stakes to attempt active management and restructuring. See Marko Simoneti & Andreja Bohm,
The Governance of PrivatizationFunds: Open Issues and Policy Recommendations, in THE GOVERNANCE OF
PRIVATIZATION FUNDS, supra note 38, at 163, 166.
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The most impressive evidence in favor of the Polish approach has been the ability of
its securities market to support cash offerings of equity securities. Between 1991 and
1998, no Czech company sold equity for cash as part of its privatization program;
conversely, some fifty Polish companies did. 55 Over the same period, no Czech company
effected an initial public offering over the Prague Stock Exchange, while some 136
Polish companies did so on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. 56 In short, only the Polish
system succeeded in developing its stock exchange so that it could perform the classic
role of serving as an engine of economic growth.
Another strong contrast between the Czech and Polish experiences involves market
performance during conditions of adversity: when the Asian financial crisis struck in
1998, Poland had a relatively mild experience. Between the end of 1996 and August
1998, the Polish stock index fell only 13.1%, 57 while the Czech market had already
partially collapsed and fell further. 58 Up until late 1998, the NIFs listed on the Warsaw
Stock Exchange seemed to be trading at or near their net asset value, while Czech funds
59
during this period often traded at steep 20% to 70% discounts off their net asset value.
Another measure of a securities market's success is the number and percentage of
firms listed on it that migrate to foreign stock exchanges. Such dual listings may imply
that the listed firm cannot raise capital on its home country exchange; alternatively, it
may be a bonding mechanism by which a firm credibly pledges to comply with disclosure
and corporate governance standards that are not enforced (or enforceable) in its home
country.60 In any event, companies in Central Europe have recently migrated to German
stock exchanges (most notably the Berlin Stock Exchange). As of early 1999, one study
finds that 117 stocks from Eastern Europe were listed on the Berlin Stock Exchange, of
61
which 24 were from the Czech Republic, but only 13 from considerably larger Poland.
Prior to the onset of the Russian financial crisis in late 1998, Poland had 2% of its listed
companies traded on German stock exchanges, while the Czech Republic had 5% (or
more than twice as many). 62 This disparity should not be surprising. Having the weaker

55. See Johnson & Shleifer, supra note 6, at 26.
56. Id.
57. See Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 48. This paper groups countries by severity of stock market decline
between the end of 1996 and August 1998 and places Poland in the "relatively moderate" decline category. See
id.
58. The Czech market collapse worsened after the time of the Asian financial crisis and hit bottom
following the 1998 Russian financial crisis. Between August 1998 and March 1999, the Czech market decline
was 30.5%, which far exceeded the 17.5% decline on the Polish market or the very mild 5.7% decline on the
Hungarian market. See Pistor, supra note 7, at 46. Pistor also finds that Czech market capitalization declined
35% following the 1998 Russian financial crisis, while Polish market capitalization actually increased 17.8%
over this same period. See id., at 47. The Prague Stock Exchange has since recovered, although this may be
partly attributable to stock market reforms enacted largely in 1998.
59. See Simoneti & B6hm, supra note 54, at 163, 174. In addition, roughly 25% of the first 500 privatized
firms are now also publicly traded. This contrast between the steep discounts in the Czech market and the
absence of discounts in the Polish market is, however, subject to an important qualification: because of the
absence of transparency in the Czech market, reported prices on the Prague Stock Exchange were often inflated,
thereby overstating the discount. The subsequent history of the NIFs after 1998 is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 63-65.
60. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 673-76 (discussing foreign listings as a bonding mechanism).
61. See Pistor, supra note 7, at 45.
62. Id. at 46.
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legal protections, Czech companies had the greater need to list on a foreign exchange
with "stronger" governance standards in order to attract foreign portfolio investors (most
of whom had already fled the Czech market because of its lack of transparency).
This happy story contrasting the regulated and unregulated worlds encounters one
serious difficulty that arose in late 1998. Beginning in approximately December 1998, the
stock prices of the Polish NIFs fell sharply, and they currently trade at discounts to their
net asset values as steep as ever existed in the Czech Republic. 63 Meanwhile, the
surviving Czech investment funds now trade at relatively modest discounts to their net
asset value (typically around 20%).64
What explains this sudden reversal? Although any answer is speculative, most NIFs
experienced board control contests in 1998 that replaced their old investment managers.
Until late 1998, the Polish government held the majority of the voting power in NIFs. But
since then, shareholders have replaced the management company in fourteen of the
original fifteen NIFs. In effect, the same fear of opportunistic control struggles that
eroded investor confidence in the Czech market appears to have devastated the value of
Polish NIFs. No longer the stable pawns of the state, these NIFs appear to have suffered a
sharp and fairly sudden loss of investor confidence.
Still, the number of firms traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange has continued to
grow, and its overall market capitalization now exceeds that of the Prague Stock
Exchange. 65 Nor has evidence yet surfaced indicating that privatized companies have
been looted or "tunneled" in Poland. Nonetheless, the bottom line evaluation must be
cautious: in transitional economies, it may take little to disturb investor confidence and
produce a flight for the exits. As they have been "deregulated" (or, perhaps more
accurately, "privatized"), the Polish NIFs may be repeating the sorry history of the Czech
funds.
B. What Really Distinguishes the Czech and Polish Experiences?
To this point, the Czech and Polish experiences have been differentiated in terms of
the highly spontaneous character of Czech privatization versus the carefully plannedindeed, constrained-character of Polish privatization. But both nations share one
common fact that is troubling for the new scholarship that emphasizes the importance of
differences in substantive corporate law: they each had a corporation law heavily based
on the German civil law structure. Put simply, their experiences were very different, but
their corporate laws were largely the same. As a result, because the corporate laws of

63. Data showing these discounts as of the fall of 1999 has been provided to me by Professor Andrew
Weiss, an economist at Boston University. He informs me that, as of late September, 1999, the average discount
on the Polish NIFs relative to their net asset value had grown to 60%, which was as great or greater than the
standard discount on Czech funds earlier in the decade.
64. Professor Weiss points to the example of the Restitution Fund, which is the largest Czech fund and
which now trades at 1300 (as of late September, 1999) and has a net asset value of 1550 (or less than a 20%
discount). In 1994, it traded for between 500 and 600. Another example is SPIF Cesky, which now trades at
1346 and was trading at 400 in December, 1994. One possible reason for this resurgence may have been reform
legislation, which was adopted in 1998. Pursuant to this legislation, many Czech funds converted to a basically
open-end status. Open-end funds do not, of course, have the same discount as a closed-end fund because their
shares can be redeemed.
65. See Pistor, supra note 7, at 48.
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Poland and the Czech Republic each provide only weak protection for minority
shareholders, 66 their different experiences cannot be used to corroborate the claim that
differences in substantive corporate law are the key causal factors that determine the
success or failure of privatization.
Yet if Poland and the Czech Republic had similar corporate laws, their approaches
to securities regulation were entirely different. Not only did Poland impose high
disclosure standards from the outset (including quarterly reporting), it also created an
67
SEC-like agency to enforce its laws from the beginning of its privatization experience.
In addition, Poland adopted ownership disclosure provisions that resembled section 13(d)
of the United State's Williams Act in order to require ownership transparency-that is,
the disclosure by substantial shareholders and potential acquirers of their beneficial
68
ownership of specified levels of a company's shares. Finally, Poland (but not the Czech
Republic) followed the British model of takeover regulation by requiring any shareholder
who acquired more than a specified level of stock to make a mandatory bid for the
as Pistor has shown, Poland had "weak" corporate law, but
remaining shares. 69 In sum,
"strong" securities law. 70
In overview, these restrictions on the undisclosed acquisition of control and the
mandatory requirement that a control acquirer offer to purchase the remaining
shareholders may have been responsible for some of the differences in the Czech and
Polish experiences. Seemingly, these restrictions precluded (or at least slowed) the frantic
scramble for control that occurred in the Czech Republic. To the extent that this is true,
the Polish experience may suggest the need for refinements in the "minority protection"
model developed by those scholars of corporate governance who have focused, somewhat
single-mindedly, on differences in substantive corporate law as the primary determinant
of ownership structure. 7 1 In comparing systems of corporate governance, many of the
most important differences may lie at the level of securities regulation. Here, rules
prohibiting insider trading, requiring ownership transparency, and restricting coercive
takeover bids may do more to protect minority shareholders from expropriation than do
the same jurisdiction's substantive corporate law rules. Indeed, as earlier suggested, the
most important common denominator between the "protective" legal regimes in the U.S.
and the U.K. may be their highly similar securities laws, not their common law origins.

66. For a closer assessment of the similarities and differences in Czech and Polish corporate law during
the period, see Pistor, supra note 7, at 35-44. Pistor notes that the Czech Republic did have a considerably lower
quorum requirement (30%), which may have facilitated some fraud, and a higher (and hence less protective)
mandatory bid requirement, but overall she finds that both countries provided only weak protections in their
corporate law for minority shareholders.
67. See id. at 37-38.
68. Id. at 37 (noting that Polish law has required ownership disclosure at the 10% and 25% levels). Section
13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires shareholders of a "reporting company" to disclose to both
the issuer and the SEC their identity, sources of financing, plans and intentions, and certain other information
when-either alone or as a part of a group--they acquire more than 5% of any class of equity security of such
an issuer. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1994).
69. Poland adopted a 33% threshold (originally, it was 50%), while the Czech Republic introduced this
reform (but only at the 50% level) only more recently. Pistor, supra note 7, at 37-38.
70. Id.
71. See sources cited supranotes 2 and 3.
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Another hypothesis, however, must also be noted: more important than these legal
differences may have been the creation of the Polish NIFs. By holding controlling stakes,
these state-created financial intermediaries blocked the path of entrepreneurs who
otherwise might have competed to seize control of newly privatized companies. A
critical, if possibly unintended, role of the NIFs was to provide an assurance to smaller
shareholders that they need not fear the potential expropriation of their investment in a
privatized company, at least because of its vulnerability to a predatory control seeker. 7 2
Indeed, much of the scramble for control in the Czech Republic seems to have been
defensively motivated: each large shareholder essentially realized that if it did not acquire
control, someone else would, with resulting injury to them. Each shareholder would
know that the acquisition of control by some other shareholder would imply a sharp
decline in the value of its minority position. As a result, the fear of loss may have
provided a greater incentive to compete for control than the expectation of any
synergistic or opportunistic gain.
In this light, the inefficient exposure to loss that the Czech system imposed on
minority shareholders may also explain the earlier noted absence of equity offerings for
cash in the Czech Republic as contrasted with their frequency in Poland. 73 Because an
offering of equity securities inherently dilutes existing shareholders, it exposes them to an
increased risk of exploitation; correspondingly, it also potentially disrupts any
equilibrium that may have been achieved among large shareholders. Having acquired a
majority position, a controlling shareholder might prefer to rely on high-cost bank
fmancings rather than utilize dilutive equity financing, because dilution of its ownership
could interfere with its ability to realize the private benefits of control. This fear was not
a danger in the Polish context, where the NIFs gave all shareholders greater assurance of
continuity for at least an interim period. Thus, one implication of the Czech experience
may be that unregulated control contests and the rapid transition from dispersed to
concentrated ownership can give rise to externalities-both political and economic.
Correspondingly, the sharp decline in the stock prices of Polish NIFs, once
shareholders were permitted to take control of them from the government, also reinforces
the interpretation that unregulated control contests expose minority investors to the risk
of expropriation and result in reduced share prices. 74 Had the Polish government
provided for a more phased transition (such as through transitional ownership ceilings or
use of staggered boards), the severity of this decline might have been reduced.
C. Other PrivatizationExperiences:Do Securities Markets Develop Naturally?
Although the Czech and Polish experiences probably supply the closest
approximation to a natural experiment that can be found in this area, their experiences are
not unique. A brief review of earlier privatization efforts finds similar cases in which
72. Lucian Bebchuk has theorized that these competitive struggles for a controlling position are
predictable whenever the private benefits of control are large and control is not locked up by special charter
provisions. See LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK, A RENT-PROTECTION THEORY OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7203, 1999). These conditions would seem
usually to be satisfied when voucher privatization is used in a transitional economy, because it exposes control
to acquisition and the private benefits of control are necessarily high when judicial controls are undeveloped.
73. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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emerging securities markets collapsed after a loss of investor confidence, including cases
in the United States. Although in the public mind the term "privatization" first probably
came into popular usage with the decision of the Thatcher government in Great Britain in
1979 to sell off government-owned enterprises, important earlier instances can be
identified. The first large-scale privatization offering to public investors seems to have
occurred in 1961, when the Konrad Adenauer government in the Federal Republic of
Germany sold a majority stake in Volkswagen in a public offering that was aimed at
small investors in Germany. 7 5 This was followed by an even larger offering in 1965 of
the government-owned shares of VEBA A.G., a German heavy mining company. Both
offerings were initially successful, but share prices fell dramatically thereafter, forcing
the Adenauer government to develop "a rescue operation ... aimed at protecting small
shareholders." 76 The experience appears to have dissuaded both Germany and other
European governments from embarking on similar programs until the Thatcher
administration initiated its ideologically motivated wave of privatizations in 1979.
During the early 1970s, the Pinochet government in Chile sought to reprivatize
industries that had earlier been nationalized by the Allende government. Sales were made
at extremely discounted prices, and when the Chilean economy later entered a debt and
payment crisis in the early 1980s, it renationalized many of these same industries. Not
until the late 1980s (at roughly the same time as the Thatcher government) did Chile
effect a more successful privatization program through the public sale of shares in stateowned enterprises. 77 However, the key event in this later, successful privatization was the
1990 privatization of Telefonos de Chile, which was largely targeted at U.S. investors
through the use of American Depositary Receipts. Mexico's very large and successful
privatization program in the 1990s has similarly been effected through privatizations of
large, state-owned companies that were directly listed on the New York Stock
78
Exchange.
Mass privatization efforts that have not been implemented through established
exchanges have fared less well. The most notable example is, of course, Russia. By
virtually all accounts, Russian privatization has involved a spectacular series of blunders
and been thwarted by pervasive corruption. As a result, most recent discussions of
79
But the
privatization have been largely preoccupied with the Russian experience.
lessons from the Russian failure are more difficult to draw because the Russian
privatization effort was flawed from the outset by critical design failures and
macroeconomic conditions that were not present in either Poland or the Czech Republic.
First, Russian privatization had a significantly different design than Czech privatization
in that substantial blocks of stock were allocated to the incumbent managers as a political
75. For a fuller description of these offerings, see William Megginson etal., The Financialand Operating
Performanceof Newly PrivatizedFirms: An InternationalEmpirical Analysis, 49 J. FIN. 403, 406 (1994). An
arguably controlling stake in Volkswagen continues to be held by one German state (Lower Saxony).
76. Id. at 407.
77. See Pan A. Yotopoulos, The (Rip) Tide of Privatization:Lessons from Chile, 17 WORLD DEV. 683,
684-87, 697-99 (1989).
78. For an overview of Mexican privatization, see Rafael La Porta & Florence Lopez-de-Silanos, Benefits
of Privatization-EvidencefromMexico, Private Sector, at 21-24 (World Bank, June 1997).
79. For recent detailed accounts, see Fox & Heller, supra note 19; Bernard Black et al., Russian
Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? (Sept. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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accommodation that was essential to the implementation of privatization. The result was
probably easily predicted: within two to three years after mass privatization, most
minority shareholders had sold their shares to the insiders, thereby producing the same
highly concentrated ownership structures that are the norm elsewhere. 80 Second, in
contrast to other recent privatization experiences, the Russian government lacked control
over its outlying regions. In these regions, privatized companies have been at least as
subject to expropriation by the local government (or coalitions led by, or affiliated with,
it) as by controlling shareholders. 8 1 Third, the legal system in Russia was almost
uniquely primitive, indeed to the point that few contractual obligations could be routinely
enforced, and resort to extra-legal means (most notably, violence) was the norm, not the
exception. Finally, the macroeconomic condition in Russia proved to be particularly
perverse. 8 2 As a result, in 1998, the Russian government defaulted on its domestic and
international debt, and the RTS stock market index fell almost 90% from its level eleven
months earlier. 83 When an experiment fails from multiple causes, it is difficult to
attribute primary responsibility to any one cause.
In contrast, what makes the Czech story more interesting than the Russian story is
that the same transition from dispersed to concentrated ownership occurred even without
the built-in bias for insider ownership or the poor macroeconomic conditions that
characterized the Russian context. Nor is the Czech experience unique. To the extent that
Czech privatization malfunctioned, lack of regulation would appear to play a greater
causal role, because other explanations are simply not as available. More generally,
except when companies have been privatized through offerings listed on international
stock exchanges, the Czech progression to concentrated ownership seems to be the
dominant pattern, with the exceptions being few in number. Poland appears to be the
most notable exception, but its story has not yet played out fully. As discussed next, this
pattern raises the question of whether this transition is an inevitable progression.
D. The Reappearanceof ConcentratedOwnership
Both in Russia and in the Czech Republic, mass-privatization through the sale or
distribution of privatization vouchers to the citizenry inevitably created a highly
dispersed ownership structure-but only for a transitory period. Over time, concentrated
ownership re-emerged. Because numerous studies have concluded that privatized firms
become more efficient, 84 it is not surprising that some studies attribute this increased

80. See Joseph Blasi & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Governance in Russia: An InitialLook in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA (Roman Frydan et al. eds., 1996).
81. See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
82. See Black et al., supra note 79.
83.

WILLIAM MEGGINSON & JEFFRY NETTER, FROM STATE TO MARKET: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL

STUDIES ON PRIVATIZATION 16 (New York Stock Exch. Working Paper No. 98-05, 1998).
84. See, e.g., Juliet D'Souza & William Megginson, The Financial and Operating Performance of
Privatized Firms During the 1990s, 54 J. FIN. 1397, 1408-09 (1999) (finding significance increases in
profitability and efficiency); Nicholas Barberis et al., How Does Privatization Work? Evidencefrom the Russian
Shops, 104 J. POL. ECON. 764 (1996) (study of 452 retail stores); ROMAN FRYDMAN ET AL., WHY OWNERSHIP
MATTERS?: POLITICIZATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE RESTRUCTURING OF ENTERPRISES IN CENTRAL

EUROPE (C.V. Starr Center Working Paper No. 98-14, 1998) (summarizing other studies); MEGGINSON &
NETTER, supranote 83.
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efficiency to the emergence of concentrated ownership. For example, one detailed study
that examined the performance over the period from 1992 to 1995 of a sample of 706
Czech firms that were privatized in 1991-1992 concluded that the greater the ownership
85
concentration, the greater the improvement in profitability and market valuation.
Unfortunately, this study examined a period that ended in 1995, prior to the subsequent
free fall in price levels on the Prague Stock Exchange. Possibly, the higher stock market
valuations at this initial stage were a transitory phenomenon which reflected the
prospective control fights that were already looming.
Still, let us assume for a moment that newly privatized firms with concentrated
ownership do initially outperform comparable firms with dispersed ownership. Does this
then imply that an economy characterized by concentrated ownership will be more
efficient than one characterized by dispersed ownership-at least in the case of
transitional economies? The problem with any such conclusion is that the benefits from
concentrated ownership may prove to be short-lived, while the costs surface only at a
delayed point. Even if concentrated ownership implies superior monitoring of
management, these benefits have to be balanced against the enhanced risk of
expropriation by controlling shareholders. Such expropriation risks the phenomenon of
securities market collapse, which in turn may result in a variety of social costs. For
example, as earlier noted, Polish securities markets have been able to support IPOs and
other cash offerings of equity securities, while Czech markets have not. 86 Economic
growth then may be at risk.
The extent of this risk has only recently begun to emerge in new research that
documents an apparent global pattern. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 adversely
affected economic development in most emerging markets, but to varying degrees.
Although most analysts have assumed that its causes lay in macroeconomic and banking
policies, one provocative new study concludes that "the weakness of legal institutions for
corporate governance had an important effect on the 87extent of [exchange rate]
depreciations and stock market declines in the Asian crisis."
Essentially, this study argues that the rate of expropriation increases when the rate of
return on investment falls. In short, managers and controlling shareholders tend to steal
more in bad times than in good times-and investors expect this. Hence, given any
adverse shock to the financial system of a region (or the world generally), the relative
decline will be worst in those countries with legal systems that confer the weakest
protections to minority shareholders. Using as its sample the twenty-five emerging
markets that are currently open to significant capital flows (and hence are the most
vulnerable to speculative attack), this study concluded that "weak enforcement of
shareholder and creditor rights had first-order importance in determining the extent of
exchange rate depreciation in 1997-98."88 Indeed, three indices of legal institutionswhich it termed "efficiency of the judiciary," "corruption," and the "rule of law"-were
found to "predict the changes in exchange rates in emerging markets better than do the

85. STIGN CLAESSENS ET AL., OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE CZECH

REPUBLIC (World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 1737, 1997).
86. See supranotes 55-56 and accompanying text.
87. Johnson etal., supra note 2, at 3.
88. Id. at 4.

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Fall

standard macro measures." 89 Other measures reflecting the strength of shareholder rights
also correlated closely with the severity of the financial crisis, but only "as long as these
90
measures reflect how rights are actually enforced." To sum up, the strength of legal
protections (as measured by actual enforcement practice) appeared to be the independent
variable that best predicted the dependent variable of severity of financial crisis.
At this juncture, it is useful to return to the Czech experience. As noted earlier, a
number of studies have found that privatized firms became more profitable to the extent
91
But is this advantage sustainable over
that their ownership was more concentrated.
time? The subsequent sharp decline in stock prices on the Prague Stock Exchange
suggests that some financial shock (from whatever source) destabilized the economy and
caused a withdrawal of investor capital. Why was the market decline so extreme in the
absence of any major macroeconomic change in the Czech economy? Perhaps investors
were aware of their potential vulnerability, but expected that managers would constrain
their rate of expropriation during "boom" times. At the first sign of "bust," however,
investors race for the exits because they expect the rate of expropriation to increase.
Whether or not one accepts this premise that the rate of expropriation rises with any
decline in return on investment, the critical factor in this scenario is that investor loss of
confidence will be greatest in those economies where they believe they are least protected
legally. In truth, assumptions about the relationship of the rate of expropriation to the
return on investment are probably unnecessary to drive this model. All that one need
hypothesize is that investors will ignore legal risks and their vulnerability to
expropriation by controlling shareholders during "boom" times, possibly on the premise
that managers and controlling shareholders will not risk disrupting the momentum that is
benefiting them all. Essentially, the Czech experience seems consistent with this pattern.
Although such data can be read to mean that legal development has a decisive
influence on the viability of securities markets, the true independent variable in such a
model may be investor confidence, and the level of such confidence may be influenced
by factors other than the strength of legal protections. Investors may learn that a
particular venue (whether a country or a stock exchange) has frequently experienced
scandals-and decide to avoid it.
Even within the United States, there is evidence consistent with this hypothesis. In
1992, the Amex launched the Emerging Company Marketplace (ECM) to trade the stocks
of small, high growth companies. 92 By 1995, it was forced to close this market after a
series of scandals had "damaged the ECM's reputation for monitoring the quality of its
listings. . . ."93 Yet investors in the ECM had the same legal rights as investors trading on
94
the NYSE. Although other factors also inhibited the growth of the ECM, the role of
scandal seems critical. Investors are neither legal scholars nor comparativists; they learn
principally from experience, not theory. Moreover, they may expect any apparent pattern

89. Id. at 6.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
92. For a detailed discussion of the ECM, see Reena Aggarwal & James J. Angel, The Rise and Fall of the
Amex Emerging Company Marketplace, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 257 (1999).
93. Id. at 283.
94. Aggarwal and Angel in fact give greater weight in their account to an adverse selection problem:
"good" firms matured from the ECM to the Amex, while "bad" firms remained behind. Id. at 263.
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that they observe to continue (even if it was in fact simply an unconnected series of
random events). Hence, scandal predicts future scandals, and investors expect more
the relatively high failure rate
expropriation. This expectation of continuity may explain
95
of "emerging company" or "incubator" stock exchanges.
The bottom line then may be that anything that invites public scandal (including
weak legal protections) creates a negative externality. If so, public policies intended to
protect market integrity and preserve investor confidence can be easily justified, even if
they may sometimes impede the ability of small and non-fraudulent firms to raise capital.
IV.

THE TECHNOLOGY OF EXPROPRIATION

Although a variety of tactics were used to expropriate wealth from Czech companies
and investment funds, the best known strategy was popularly referred to as "tunneling."
Essentially, this practice involved the sale or transfer of a controlled firm's products or
assets at below market prices to another company, which was controlled by the same
controlling group as controlled the original firm. Gradually, through a series of
transactions that might involve a number of such shell companies, the controlled
corporation's assets could be hollowed out (hence, the term "tunneling"); alternatively,
its expected future cash flow could be transferred to the shell company by causing the
controlled firm to enter into long-term production contracts under which most of its
output was effectively sold at cost (or less) to one or more shell companies.
Variations on this basic pattern were numerous. For example, an entrepreneur might
borrow funds to buy a controlling stake in a Czech company, using a personally owned
corporation as the vehicle that borrowed the acquisition debt from a bank. Once control
of the firm was acquired, the entrepreneur could merge the personally controlled firm into
the privatized firm, in order to make the latter liable for the entrepreneur's personal
acquisition indebtedness. 96 As a result, the entrepreneur forces the other shareholders to
bear much of the cost of the entrepreneur's acquisition of control.
Such unfair self-dealing is not particularly novel or imaginative. But, precisely for
that reason, the fact that it worked so effectively in the Czech Republic suggests there
must be some characteristic weakness or vulnerability in Czech law and (because Czech
corporate law was largely patterned after German law) in the civil law generally. A key
reason why "tunneling" was successful involved the availability of legal techniques by
which it could be insulated from judicial scrutiny. A 1997 study by the Czech Ministry of
Finance examined a variety of tactics for looting privatized companies and reported that:
"[Tiunneling" into companies is a frequent phenomenon. Current 'corporate
raiders' have discovered a risk-free method of removing money from

95. Aggarwal and Angel observe that:
During the 1980s, virtually every stock market in Europe established a special section for
companies that were too small to meet the normal listing requirements.... Many of these
markets appeared to prosper for a short time, but ultimately they all suffered from severe
illiquidity and attracted few companies or investors.
Id. at 281. Amsterdam closed its Official Parallel Market in 1993, and London closed its Unlisted Securities
Market in 1996. Id.
96. For these and other examples, see Coffee, supra note 37, at 113-14.
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companies. This method consists of holding a general meeting of shareholders
in which the 'raiders' have a voting majority; this meeting passes a decision on
a transaction involving corporate property ... and the Board of Directors of the
company then carries out this operation, with consequent damage to the
company. No (minority) shareholder can blame the Board of Directors of the
company for this operation as it is bound by the decision of the general
97
meeting.
In short, if the self-dealing transaction were approved by a majority of the shareholders,
the directors were effectively insulated from legal liability. Although minority
shareholders could sue to challenge action taken at the shareholders' meeting, they would
receive little disclosure about the terms of the transaction and hence were not in a
position to raise an effective challenge.
To the extent this assessment is accurate, it reveals a sharp contrast between the
constraints of Czech and those of common law jurisdictions. For example, although U.S.
law gives considerable weight to shareholder ratification, U.S. law generally does not
permit a self-interested shareholder to ratify a transaction between the corporation and
itself (or an affiliate). 98 Typically, only the vote of a disinterested majority of the
shareholders can have this impact. Thus, the practical consequence of this difference is to
accord the majority shareholder (or shareholder group) far greater power to impose selfdealing transactions on the minority and hence to create a far stronger incentive for a
shareholder or group seeking control to obtain a majority interest. Although German
corporate law (and hence Czech law, as a legal system substantially based on that model)
permits the shareholder to attack the results of a shareholder meeting, this is an uphill
battle, because it asks the court to overrule the majority of the shareholders, not simply
the board of directors.
Majority ratification was not, however, the only technique by which "tunneling"
could be effected. Well before achieving an absolute majority, a shareholder or a
shareholder group might achieve de facto control of the board and thus be in a position to
approve the same self-dealing transactions without shareholder ratification, based rather
on board approval. Directors who approved a clearly unfair self-dealing transaction might
face some risk of legal liability, but this risk is mitigated by two key factors that
characterize many civil law systems. First, shareholders will not necessarily learn of the
self-dealing transaction. Under the German corporate law, an elaborate body of law
regulates the relationship between the companies that belong to a holding structure, or
"Konzem." This body of law permits a majority shareholder to dominate its subsidiary,
99
but expects the majority to compensate the minority for any detriment that they suffer.
Although the firm's auditors must report on such intercompany dealings, they report only
97. See Current Aspects of the Czech CapitalMarket, Czech Ministry of Finance (internal report dated
1997).
98. Some U.S. statutes specifically sterilize the votes of interested shareholders in establishing the
procedures by which a conflict of interest transaction may be approved by the board or shareholders so as to
overcome the presumption against fiduciary self-dealing. See, e.g.. CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1990).
Others, including Delaware, have reached a similar result by judicial decision. See Fleigler v. Lawrence, 361
A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) (shareholder approval merely removes "cloud" and does not sanction unfairness).
99. For a brief overview, relating the application of this law to transitional economies, see Pistor, supra
note 7, at 17-18.
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to the controlled firm's supervisory board, not to its minority shareholders. German
commentators have candidly acknowledged that this non-transparent approach to the
regulation of self-dealing leaves at least a potential loophole in the civil law's system of
corporate governance: shareholders cannot challenge transactions of which they are
00
unaware. 1
More generally, German corporate law views the shareholders' meeting as the
appropriate forum at which different issues are to be debated and resolved. This may
work adequately in a system of concentrated ownership, where large shareholders can be
expected to attend the meetings. But privatization inherently creates dispersed
shareholders with small stakes, and they are less likely to be informed or to attend such a
meeting. In addition, management can schedule the meeting at remote sites on little
notice, which tactic will work to discourage at least small shareholders. Moreover, Czech
law exacerbated this problem by establishing a particularly low quorum requirement
(30%) that effectively permitted as few as two large funds to satisfy this requirement and
10 1
vote through action at a hastily convened meeting.
In transitional economies, these dangers are further aggravated by the greater
likelihood that the supervisory board may not be independent or may simply be too
inexperienced or passive to evaluate the transaction's fairness. Second, the judicial
systems in transitional economies have not been able to develop remedies or standards on
their own to reduce the risk of expropriation. Third, even if shareholders do learn of the
transaction, they may lack the incentive to take action or sue. Here, the standard
collective action problem surfaces: small shareholders will seldom have sufficient
economic reason to undertake costly litigation. In addition, once a control block is
formed, it is rare to find any other substantial shareholder group; 10 2 instead, other
potential competitors for control appear to exit quickly once de facto control has been
achieved by a rival. Thus, few individual shareholders will face a sufficiently substantial
loss to justify the cost of litigation on an individual basis. In the U.S., this collective
action problem is at least partially solved by (1) the existence of the contingent fee
agreement (which is essentially a risk-shifting device by which the small shareholder
transfers the risks of the litigation to an entrepreneurial plaintiff's attorney), and (2) the
prevailing legal rule in the United States that a successful plaintiff in a derivative action
is entitled to have the corporation pay its reasonable attorney's fees. Absent similar
enforcement mechanisms, minority shareholders in transitional economies will
predictably remain passive, even if they learn that they have been defrauded.
V. POLICY LESSONS FROM THE PRIVATIZATION EXPERIENCE

Several common denominators are discernible in the early efforts to privatize state100. See, e.g., Herbert Wiedemann, The German Experience with the Law of Affiliated Enterprises, in
GROUPS OF COMPANIES IN EUROPEAN LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON MULTINATIONAL

ENTERPRISES (Klaus J. Hopt ed., 1982); Ulrich Immenga, The Law of Groups in the Federal Republic of
Germany, in GROUPS OF COMPANIES INTHE EEC 85 (Eddy Wymeersch ed., 1993).
101. See Pistor, supra note 7, at 35-44. These techniques were in fact used in practice by one notorious
Czech entrepreneur. See Charles Wallace, The Pirates of Prague, FORTUNE, Dec. 23, 1996, at 78 (discussing
the career of Victor Kozeny); Coffee, supra note 37, at 115.
102. See La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, supra note 2, at 505 (in 75% of cases, no
other large shareholder exists when there is a controlling shareholder).
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owned enterprises and to develop securities markets in transitional economies. First, most
recent studies of the privatization process have reported that the most obvious corporate
monitors (namely institutional investors and, in particular, privatization investment
funds) have shown little interest in monitoring. Either they have been clearly ill-equipped
for such a role, or, more typically, they have used their "insider" positions to engage in
informed trading in thin and non-transparent markets or to pursue other self-interested
ends. While the circumstances vary, the underlying cause seems the same: restructuring is
a costly undertaking in which the gains are necessarily shared with other shareholders. In
contrast, so long as markets are non-transparent and minority protections largely nonexistent, it may be easier and more profitable to expropriate wealth than to create it.
Second, to the extent that large shareholders are active, their primary focus seems to be
on obtaining a controlling position-either to exploit the private benefits of control or as
a defensive measure to protect themselves from expropriation, or both. Once this
scramble for control produces a victor, "tunneling" begins. Third, emerging securities
markets seem vulnerable to sudden collapses. Once a market becomes stigmatized, the
decline is fast, not slow, because a sudden exogenous shock can cause both foreign and
domestic investors to race for the exits-if they lose confidence.
To remedy these problems, some have called for the wholesale reform of corporate
and securities laws in order to introduce the more protective features of Anglo-American
law into the typically civil law codes of most transitional countries. This sounds
desirable, but closer analysis reveals a problem in this approach: little consensus exists as
to precisely what are the most important and protective features of Anglo-American law.
For example, preemptive rights play an important role in the U.K., but virtually no role in
the U.S. 10 3 In contrast, class actions may generate a desirable level of deterrence in the
U.S., but are unknown in the U.K. Although some research seems to show that common
10 4
a
law systems outperform civil law systems in protecting minority shareholders,
satisfactory explanation for the common law's apparent superiority remains elusive.
Other commentators have stressed that the development of strong securities markets
requires high disclosure standards and protection for minority shareholders from
105
This seems clearly valid,
expropriation (both of information and property) by insiders.
but it still leaves open the considerable problem of how to get to such an ideal state from
the existing starting points.
In overview, possible reforms can be grouped under three headings: (1) judicial
reforms (which respond either to the underdeveloped state of the judiciary in transitional
economies or to special problems relating to the alleged rigidity of the civil law); (2)
structural reforms (which may require legislation but do not involve legal rules); and (3)
legislative reforms (which might relate to either substantive corporate law or securities
regulation). This section will begin with judicial reforms because it seems necessary to
assess frankly what can and cannot be expected of the judiciary in developing countries.
Thereafter, it will consider both structural reforms and possible legislative revisions.

103. See
104. See
105. See
Nontriviality

Black & Coffee, supra note 23 at 2079.
sources cited supra notes 2 and 3.
Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Stock Markets: The
of Securities Law (July 1999) (working paper, on file with author).
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A. JudicialReforms

Although it is conclusory to simply assume that common law systems necessarily
offer greater protection to minority shareholders than do civil law systems, the evidence
10 6
is strong that dispersed ownership persists primarily in common law legal regimes.
Potentially, this could be the result of statutory provisions that are generally found in
common law systems. However, to date, proponents of the common law's superiority
have not been able to provide a convincing explanation of the critical statutory
deficiencies of the civil law or the common law's features that better protect minority
shareholders. Alternative hypotheses need therefore to be considered.
1. A Hypothesis of the Common Law's Advantages
One plausible hypothesis is that the real superiority of common law systems lies in
the distinctive role of the common law judge. A considerable "law and economics"
literature views the corporate charter as a highly incomplete contract. 10 7 Necessarily,
there are gaps in this contract that must be filled. "Law and economics" theorists have
disagreed over the years as to what principle or formula the court should use in seeking to
fill these gaps, 10 8 but consensus exists that the common law judge can and should fill
these gaps. In contrast, the civil law judge may not have the same authority or the same
expansive understanding of the judicial role. To the extent that the civil law distrusts
judicial activism or views it as a usurpation of the legislature's role, the civil law judge is
confined to the narrower role of interpreting what comprehensive civil codes have
actually specified. Thus, at least at the margin, the common law encourages gap-filling,
while the civil law tends to impede it.
Any summary description of the differences between the civil law and the common
law will necessarily omit much and risks stereotyping legal systems that have
considerable subtlety and variation. Nonetheless, the role of the judge does appear
significantly different under the two systems. 10 9 If it overstates to say that the civil law
judge is simply a bureaucrat whose job it is to interpret and apply a written body of
statutes, it is still true that the civil law jurist lacks the same freedom and discretion as the
common law judge to search through a vast storehouse of legal precedents to find the rule
best suited for the case before the court. 1 10 By definition, the inventory of potentially

106. Japan is the marginal case because it has dispersed ownership (along with a unique control structure).
It is primarily a civil law country, but with American securities laws imposed in the aftermath of World War II.
This pattern may suggest that securities laws are more important than common law remedies, or it may just be
that Japan has developed unique institutions by which to preserve investor confidence.
107. For standard statements of this perspective, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 1-39; see
also Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A ContractualPerspective, 18 J. CORP. L.
185 (1993).
108. Compare Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, FillingGaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (recommending "information forcing" rule), with EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 8 (preferring wealth maximizing rule).
109. See, e.g., RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 339
(2d ed. 1978).
110. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986) (emphasizing the
technocratic role of common law judges); see also MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS 136 (1981).
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applicable precedents that the common law creates confers greater discretion upon the
legal decision-maker.
This distinction has even greater force in the area of private law. On the one hand,
civil law codes tend to be especially comprehensive in this area and thus arguably leave
less room for gap-filling. Conversely, the common law (and particularly corporate law)
does not view statutes as the only (or even principal) source of law. Under the common
law, legal duties can arise that are independent of any statutory source. The most
important example for corporate law is the concept of fiduciary duty. Fiduciary duties can
develop out of a course of dealing or a relationship involving trust and confidence where
neither side has contractually assumed any duty to the other.111 In corporate law, the best
example of how the concept of fiduciary duty invites common law judges to fill gaps
involves the duty of loyalty. Although some American states do define the duty of care
by statute, the broader duty of loyalty is generally left to the common law process of
judicial interpretation. There, it rests on a common law foundation consisting of several
centuries of judicial precedent. Even before the modem corporation arose, the law of
agency and the law of trusts held the servant accountable to the master for secret profits
obtained from use of the master's property. These decisions were later applied to hold
corporate officials-including officers, directors, and controlling shareholders-to
similar standards. In Delaware, the foundational decision defining the contours of this
duty is Guth v. Loft, 1 2 which in broad and somewhat rhetorical prose instructs corporate
fiduciaries that they are held to an "uncompromising duty of loyalty." 1 13 Equally famous
decisions in New York and elsewhere have used similarly broad language, including, of
course, Justice (then Judge) Cardozo's famous phrase that a fiduciary must observe not
merely the "morals of the marketplace . . . but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive." I 14 Sophisticated judges today recognize that such broad norms must be
applied in a context-specific fashion, and this may lead them to de-emphasize the
rhetorical flourishes of an earlier generation and instead consider the hypothetical bargain
into which shareholders and corporate fiduciaries have entered. But attempts to "contract
out" from the duty of loyalty through broad exculpatory charter provisions have generally
1
failed. 15
The immediately relevant point is that the common law's concept of fiduciary duty
both enables and instructs the common law judge to fill in the gaps in an incomplete
contract. Indeed, the fiduciary concept both tells the court that implied and noncancelable conditions must be read into the corporate contract and provides a rich
repository of illustrations in the form of cases to guide the court. No similar deep
inventory of legal precedents existing apart from the statutory law of the corporations

111. The law of insider trading has shown how complex this issue can be when a fiduciary duty arises, but
the key criteria are (1) the possession of discretion to act for the beneficiary by the party to be charged with the
duty, and (2) dependence by the beneficiary. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir.
1991).
112. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
113. Id. at 510-11.
114. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
115. See, e.g., Irwin v. West End Dev. Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972) ('Exculpatory
provisions of corporate articles create no license to steal."), modified on other grounds, 481 F.2d 34 (10th Cir.
1973).
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code arms the civil law judge. To be sure, some modest steps towards recognizing a
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders have been taken in some civil law jurisdictions
(most notably, Germanyl1 6), but the concept has been stated only in the abstract and
lacks any effective enforcement mechanism. As a result, although the differences
between the civil law and the common law can easily be overstated, the civil law
essentially views the corporations code as the law and confines the judge to, more or less,
mechanically applying it, while for the common law judge, corporate law is a complex
amalgam of statutes and judicial decisions. Rather than replacing or superseding earlier
judicial precedents, the statutory corporations code can be seen as attempting to codify
those precedents.
This hypothesis that the common law tends to encourage gap-filling, while the civil
law discourages it, certainly remains open to challenge. Some empirical evidence finds
British judges, for example, to be less "daring" than their civil law counterparts in France
or Germany.11 7 But whatever the overall level of caution of British judges, the context of
corporate law may be distinctive. There, the concept of fiduciary duty-with its clear
statement that there exists a legal duty, independent of statute or contract, to be fair to
minority shareholders-invites and prods courts to fill in apparent gaps in the corporate
contract.
Still, even if the common law does better arm the judge to resist opportunism, what
relevance does this contrast have for transitional economies? That is, even if common law
judges have greater discretion and can fashion novel remedies, it does not follow that
their style of judicial behavior can be imposed on civil law judiciaries. It is simply not a
feasible reform to attempt to convert civil law judges into common law judges (it would
be easier to convert financial economists into law professors, or vice versa). But such
pervasive reform may not be needed, because only a small portion of the workload of
most judges in either system will deal with corporate or securities law matters. The
simpler course may be simply to transfer this portion of their caseload to a specialized
tribunal, as next discussed.
2. Specialized Courts
The inflexibility of civil law courts has already led to the creation of specialized
courts in some civil law countries, which specialized courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over some subject matters. 118 One example is the German experience with labor law
116. The German Federal Supreme Court recognized that controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty of
loyalty to minority shareholders in the much discussed "Linotype Case" in early 1988. See Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 103, 184 (F.R.G.). See generally, Hwa-Jin Kim,
Markets, FinancialInstitutions, and CorporatePerspectivesfrom Germany, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 371,
392-94 (1995). In addition, Germany has a separate body of law called "Konzem law" which is intended to
protect both minority shareholders in, and creditors of, companies that belong to a group of companies. See also
Immenga, supra note 100. See generally, J. Bantz Bonano, The Protection of Minority Shareholders in a
Konzern Under German and United States Law, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 151 (1977).
Whatever the situation in Germany, far fewer rights (or remedies) that can be exercised by minority
shareholder seem to be recognized elsewhere on the Continent. See Jonathan R. Macey, Italian Corporate
Governance: One American's Perspective, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 121, 129-35.
117. See Cooter & Ginsburg, supra note 22, at 300-01.
118. Russia has experimented with an "economic court" system, but with mixed results at best. See Karen
Halverson, Resolving Economic Disputes in Russia's Market Economy, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59 (1996). In
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courts, which were created because labor law inherently requires a difficult style of
decision-making."l 9 Indeed, even common law countries have made substantial use of
specialized tribunals to hear securities law disputes. For example, the federal securities
120
laws now also contemplate their enforcement before administrative law judges.
Thus, a practical approach to effective enforcement may lie in creating a cadre of
administrative judges within an SEC-like agency, authorized to broadly enforce both
disclosure obligations and certain rules against self-dealing (such as the insider trading
prohibition). Such judges would be trained within the agency and empowered to impose
substantial civil penalties. Their jurisdiction could be limited to enforcement cases
brought by the agency, or it could be expanded to include suits by investors for
restitution. 121 Although these judges would presumably lack criminal law jurisdiction,
they could be authorized to grant bar orders that could effectively suspend or disbar an
individual or entity from the functional activity of being a broker, investment adviser,
accountant, or attorney, or from having any association with any entity that engaged in
these activities. As a further backstop, persons who knowingly engaged in such specified
activities with such a defendant after the time of the entry of the bar or suspension order
might also face similar penalties. Further, appeal of such orders or decisions might only
be made to the jurisdiction's court, which would be authorized to reverse it only on a
finding that it was without any factual or legal support.
At this point, the agency acquires an in-house enforcement arm that lacks only the
traditional judge's power to issue injunctions. Indeed, "cease and desist" orders could be
authorized that partly fill even this gap. The remaining problem may be how to enforce
bar or suspension orders. In transitional economies, a broker or investment adviser barred
from that activity may persist in soliciting customers, effecting transactions, and giving
investment advice. One answer may lie in centralizing trading on a more easily monitored
exchange and penalizing persons who work with or for the suspended person. Another
answer may be to allow customers and counter parties to rescind transactions (or refuse to
pay for losing transactions) with any barred, suspended, or unauthorized person.
Whatever the means used, enforcement problems can be solved, so long as the agency
does not depend on (and cannot be nullified by) the traditional judiciary.

contrast to an independent economic court, the proposal here made is for a specialized court that is located
within the agency in whose law the court is to specialize.
119. German labor courts date back to the Weimar Republic and were designed "to force labormanagement disputes into a procedural framework similar to the political process of party competition and
parliamentary decision making." See Erhard Blankenburg, Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands
Compared to NeighboringGermany, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 26 (1998). The German labor courts now have 10
divisions at the federal level and 27 judges at this level alone. Id. at 27.
120. As a result of recent legislative revisions, Section 21B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 now
authorizes civil penalties in administrative proceedings in amounts up to $500,000 (in egregious cases).
Similarly, Section 21C of the same statute authorizes the SEC to impose administrative "cease and desist"
orders-in effect, a type of civil injunction. Thus, even in the United States where judicial remedies are probably
most available and most flexible, securities regulators believed it important to bring at least some remedies "in
house" where they would be litigated before administrative law judges trained at the agency and exclusively
involved with the securities law enforcement.
121. In civil law countries, there is no right to a jury trial, which is the factor probably most responsible for
limiting the jurisdiction of administrative law judges in civil cases in the United States.
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To sum up, civil law judges may frustrate a regulatory scheme for any of a variety of
reasons, including: (1) because they are inflexible and literalistic; (2) because they are
over worked and consider regulatory enforcement a non-essential task; or (3) because (in
some countries) they are susceptible to corruption and bribery. Moving the enforcement
mechanism at least partially "in house" into the administrative process is a practical
answer to all of these problems. "In house" administrative judges can be socialized to
view securities regulation through the same lens as the agency; they will not have other
priorities to distract them; and they should be less corruptible (or, at least, more easily
monitored and removed).
B. StructuralReforms
Even if legal rules cannot be predictably or evenly enforced in transitional
economies, other structural mechanisms might be used to prevent the kind of systematic
expropriation that characterized the Czech experience.
1. PhasedPrivatization
The Polish experience with NIFs-in effect, state-created, controlling
shareholders-may supply a useful model for a more gradual form of privatization. Such
controlling shareholders could serve several distinct functions: (1) they prevent (or at
least delay) the scramble for control that characterized the Czech experience-at least
until the legal and regulatory structure has gained some experience with privatization; (2)
they may constitute more active monitors than private investment funds; at a minimum,
they can at least be charged with the mission of developing a restructuring plan for their
portfolio companies; and (3) they serve as a means of aggregating individual shareholders
and thus partially solving collective action problems.
Ultimately, however, true privatization requires that the NIF wither away-or else
firms would still remain under indirect state control. Thus, a strategy for a phased
downsizing of the NIF is necessary. Here, the Polish model was incomplete, because it
gave the NIFs a ten-year life, but did not provide for the gradual shrinkage of their
controlling blocks. Instead, a subtler approach might have been to reduce the NIF's
stakes from the 33% starting point on an annual basis: i.e., down to 30% after year one;
25% after year two; 20% after year three, etc. In addition, it might be wise to stagger this
schedule so that some NIFs downsized and disappeared faster than others-thereby
creating a natural experiment and permitting legislative or regulatory reforms if the first
generation of NIFs to disappear gave rise to a series of scandals. Such a phased reduction
makes more sense than simply turning the NIFs over to private owners at a single stroke
because that approach invites the same rent-seeking struggle for control as occurred with
the Czech funds.
Another attraction of this approach is that it should encourage foreign portfolio
investors (who will not seek control and know they cannot actually manage portfolio
companies) to remain active in the equity market and possibly become a monitoring
substitute that over time could collectively replace the state-created NIFs. In contrast, a
scramble for control in which the winner acquires a significant control premium may
cause them to flee the market because they cannot compete. Still, the overriding
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attraction of this approach is that it is "self-enforcing" and does not require judicial
22
implementation in order to discourage rent-seeking control contests. 1
2. Stock Exchange Listing Standards
Long before there was an SEC in the United States, the New York Stock Exchange
and the London Stock Exchange had succeeded in winning investor confidence. They did
so by imposing relatively rigorous disclosure and listing standards and transparency
requirements that exceeded those prevailing in other markets. Exchanges do not have
ideal incentives, however, for the task of enforcement. Because they profit on trading
volume, and they compete to list companies, they will not wish to delist an actively
traded company, even when it misbehaves badly. Similarly, their incentives to take
enforcement action against powerful broker-dealers may also be suboptimal. For these
reasons, at least in a transitional economy, the control over listing standards may better
belong with a government agency.
Here, the contrast between the Czech and Polish experiences is particularly
instructive. As of late 1998, only 253 companies traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange,
while some 1716 firms traded in the Czech market in 1995-a nearly 7:1 ratio, despite
the fact that the Polish economy dwarfs that of the considerably smaller Czech
Republic. 123 Eventually, the Prague Stock Exchange was forced to delist over 75% of its
24
companies, both in order to maintain its credibility and to satisfy Czech regulators.1
Of course, if exchange trading is restricted, substitutes will develop, including
formalized over-the-counter markets. Such markets may be risky and characterized by
dubious offerings and market practices. So be it. Their potential failure should not
jeopardize the higher-quality market. Indeed, markets may naturally self-segregate into
high quality and lesser-quality markets. In times of economic stress, the lower-quality
market should incur the greater decline.
Such a pattern would permit significant privatization without exposing the principal
securities market to the same risk of a Czech-style collapse. Enforcement resources might
also be concentrated on the higher-quality market to maintain its reputational integrity.
One goal of this effort would be to convince foreign portfolio investors that the higherquality market could be trusted and to encourage their investment in it.
3. The Optimal Monitor
The Polish and Czech experiences represent polar extremes. Essentially, the Czech
privatization process relied on highly entrepreneurial, but legally unconstrained, monitors
in the form of investment funds that more or less spontaneously arose. In contrast, the
Polish approach was to rely upon highly constrained, state-created NIFs, whose
entrepreneurial skills and incentives remain unproven. Neither choice seems optimal (at
least by itself). There is, however, a third, obvious candidate: the existing foreign
portfolio investor. Not only do foreign institutional investors have relatively scandal-free
122. I use "self-enforcing" here in the same sense as that term was originally used by Professors Black and
Kraakman to mean a remedy or protection that did not require judicial enforcement to be effective. See Black &
Kraakman, supra note 17.
123. See supra notes 30, 52, and accompanying text.
124. See Pistor, supra note 7, at 39 (1301 of 1716 Czech firms delisted under pressure from regulators).
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histories (and reputations that they wish to preserve), but there is evidence that they make
superior monitors. One recent study by two Harvard Business School researchers
examined data from India during the 1990s and concluded that foreign institutional
investors significantly outperformed domestic financial institutions as corporate
monitors. 125 Domestic financial institutions, they found, had insufficient incentives or
skills to monitor management or play any effective role in corporate governance. In
contrast, foreign institutional ownership proved to be positively correlated with positive
changes in Tobin's Q (while domestic financial ownership was actually negatively
correlated with such changes). 126 Such a finding that domestic financial institutions play
only a modest monitoring role (and may have conflicted motives) is essentially consistent
12 7
with the Czech experience and with similar findings about Russian privatization.
Equally important, this study found that foreign institutional investment only occurs
under circumstances of high transparency (for example, institutions tend to avoid
investment in affiliated business groups). Hence, a stock exchange with rigorous listing
requirements and high transparency seems likely to attract the most effective and
experienced corporate monitors. In turn, as stock exchange listing is seen to attract
foreign equity capital, the willingness of other companies to list and accept meaningful
listing conditions may increase. To be sure, this strategy has its limitations: small
capitalization corporations and small market countries tend to be ignored by institutional
investors. But that is no reason to reject a partial answer.
More can, of course, be done to attract foreign investors. While the use of voucher
privatization was politically necessary at the outset of privatization for a variety of
reasons, contemporary sales of the remaining state-owned shares in partially privatized
enterprises might be made through auction sales to which foreign institutional investors
were specifically invited.
C. Legislative Reform
The Czech experience with "tunneling" does suggest that at least the German civil
law system of corporate governance unnecessarily exposes minority shareholders to risks
of expropriation. The key problems center around disclosure and enforcement.
1. Overview
Because concentrated ownership systems of corporate governance have few
companies in which a majority of the shares are held by public (i.e., non-controlling)
shareholders, their legal rules have understandably focused on protecting the minority
shareholder from the controlling shareholder, not from management. Management, it is
assumed, can be controlled by the supervisory board or by powerful shareholders. Hence,

125.

See TARUN KHANNA & KRISHNA PALEPU, EMERGING MARKET BUSINESS, FOREIGN INVESTORS AND

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6955, 1999).
126. Id. at 19. "Tobin's Q" is a well-recognized financial measure that consists of the ratio of the firm's
market value to the replacement cost of its assets. A low Tobin's Q (which arises if the replacement cost
exceeds or approaches the firm's market value) is seen as indicating poor managerial performance. See, e.g.,
Henri Servaes, Tobin 's Q and the Gainsfrom Takeovers, 46 J. FIN. 409 (1991).
127. See generally, Roman Frydman et al., Needed Mechanisms of Corporate Governance and Finance in
Eastern Europe, in ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION 171 (1993).
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German law does not authorize an American-style derivative action in which a small
shareholder can cause the company to sue management. This role is instead given to the
supervisory board.
But privatization inherently creates publicly held companies with dispersed
ownership, and hence it gives rise to the danger of managerial expropriation because
there are not necessarily any large shareholders to monitor management at the outset. In
short, there is a fundamental mismatch: a system of legal rules designed to deal with
concentrated ownership works less well when confronted with the new phenomenon of
dispersed ownership.
2. Disclosure
German law does provide that a managing director is liable if the director
intentionally or negligently fails to prevent the corporation from doing business to its
disadvantage with a company affiliated with the director. 128 But German law does not
obligate the director to disclose to the shareholders any personal financial interest that the
director has in a proposed transaction. 129 Even when disclosure is required (as it is in the
case of transactions between parent corporations and its majority-owned subsidiaries
within a "Konzem" or affiliated group), disclosure must only be given to the supervisory
board, not the shareholders. This makes any right to sue largely academic if shareholders
lack the knowledge that will cause them to raise objections. This critique is by no means
new and has long been raised by German academics themselves. 130 Yet even if
disclosure were required (as surely it should), and even if a derivative action were
permitted, it might have little impact unless American-style contingent fees were
permitted. This seems unlikely, given the shock that civil lawyers express at such a
system. As discussed below, disclosure to shareholders should be required, and might be
enforced through listing standards.
3. Self-Dealing: ListingStandards Versus ProphylacticRules
A consensus seems to exist that it is unrealistic to place high expectations on either
the judiciary or independent directors in transitional economies. 131 Judges are likely to
enforce satisfactorily only bright-line rules. Thus, it seems ill-advised to make proof of
intent or purpose or bad faith necessary elements of any cause of action because this
increases the unpredictability of results. But this premise leads to two immediate
problems: (1) U.S. and U.K. law do not bar self-dealing transactions, but rather subject
them to a variety of highly nuanced standards, and (2) in many transitional economies,
affiliated business groups are the norm, meaning that intra-corporate transactions within

128. 1 rely here on the advice of Professor Theodor Baums of the University of Osnabruck for this
proposition, who cites me to Section 93 of the German Stock Corporation Act.
129. 1again rely on Professor Baums for this statement. See also Ekkehard Wenger & Christogh Kaserer,
The German System of Corporate Govemance-A Model That Should Not Be Imitated 27-29 (working paper,
on file with author) (discussing the absence of disclosure obligations under German corporate law and weakness
of German proxy system).
130. See supra notes 100, 116, and accompanying text.
131. For a strong and sensible statement of this view, see Black & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 1925-27.
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such affiliated groups will be common. Yet such transactions can often be used to
expropriate wealth from minority investors.
This dilemma could be addressed in a number of ways. Corporate law could simply
preclude self-dealing (or make it so legally uncertain as to place a prohibitive penalty on
it). This was essentially what U.S. law did as of the late 19th Century, when the U.S. was
itself a transitional economy. 132 Potentially, such a prophylactic rule would last only for
the time it took the transitional economy to mature (which is again the U.S. experience).
But this approach might require dismantling of all affiliated groups, and this could be
economically disruptive and politically impractical.
The other, more feasible alternative would be state-imposed listing standards that
kept members of affiliated business groups off the "high quality" exchange, at least if
their inter-company transactions reduced transparency. This would place a considerable
cost on self-dealing (by denying members of affiliated groups easy access to the equity
markets), but the cost is probably not prohibitive. Those firms that truly found
membership in an affiliated group to be efficient could probably still obtain equity capital
from the over-the-counter market. More importantly, this option forces a firm to choose
between a "dispersed ownership" versus a "concentrated ownership" governance system,
and it signals to institutional investors that a high-quality equity market is intended to
accommodate only firms that elect to comply with the rules of the former system.
Supplementing this prohibition on listing members of an affiliated business group
(other than the sole parent) would be listing rules precluding defined self-dealing
transactions by management, controlling shareholders, or other insiders. Such rules
would, of course, focus only on (1) transactions that were material to shareholders
(excluding, for example, ordinary compensation), and (2) transactions that could be easily
monitored (for example, purchases and sales of corporate divisions or significant
corporate assets by persons affiliated with management). Some low-visibility transactions
would escape the scope of these rules, and some violations would inevitably escape
detection. But if the enforcement of such rules were delegated to the jurisdiction's
securities commission (rather than the exchange itself), this system could be implemented
with respect to the largest and most important corporations in the jurisdiction-without
relying on costly and uncertain litigation. Over time, such a system could create its own
culture of compliance, with smaller firms seeking to elect in as they matured. In effect,
entry into the "high quality" market would constitute a bonding device by which firms
could assure investors of fair treatment and thereby lower their cost of equity capital.
4. Control Acquisition
Following repeated scandals in the Czech securities market, reform legislation was
adopted in 1996 that essentially introduced a key element of the British corporate
governance system: namely, no person could cross a defined ownership threshold, except
by making a tender offer for all the firm's shares. Polish law interestingly already had

132. The shifting attitude of U.S. law and the progression from flat prohibition of fiduciary self-dealing to
greater tolerance is described in Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflicts of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966).
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such a limitation from its outset. 133 Under the Czech legislation, once any person crossed
any of the 50%, 66-2/3%, or 75% ownership thresholds, such a person is required to
make a public tender offer for the remaining shares within 60 days thereafter at a price
equal to the weighted price on the market over the prior 6 months. 134 Conceptually, this
protects the minority, but there would seem to be serious flaws in the particular design of
this system. For example, control can easily be obtained well short of the 50% level, at
which point the controlling shareholder can begin to exploit the minority (by withholding
dividends, engaging in self-dealing transactions, etc.). Once such conduct occurs or is
signaled, the company's stock price should predictably decline. Thus, when the
controlling shareholder elects to cross the 50% threshold, the stock price should already
be deflated below its true "going concern" value. As a result, for this remedy to work, an
earlier threshold (say, 20%) seems necessary.
Under a legal regime that allowed shareholders to aggregate shares up to 25%, but
required a public tender offer for the remainder, many would stop at the 25% level. This
does not seem undesirable. Some evidence suggests that such large, but noncontrolling,
shareholders enhance the value of the firm by partially solving the collective action
problem inherent in dispersed ownership. 135 In a world where legal controls are weak,
drawing such a line may be the most practical reform that can be easily monitored and
enforced.
Yet for these reforms to work, more must be required than simply mandating that a
tender offer be made at the average price over a recent period. Such a rule allows the
large shareholder to profit from undisclosed material information and may be spurned by
suspicious minority shareholders who suspect that the firm has hidden value. Although
full disclosure should, of course, be required in connection with this offer, full disclosure
in this context can have a counter-productive, even perverse effect: if shareholders learn
that the firm has greater value than the market previously had recognized, they will spurn
the offer-and thereafter be exposed to exploitation by the new controlling shareholders
if they are successful in obtaining a controlling interest. Accordingly, some minimum
tender premium should be mandated. For example, a 20% premium over the prior
average market price might be the best practical compromise, and it can be justified in
part based on the reduced disclosure and regulatory costs that the company will incur
once it becomes a private company after the tender offer. Any rule requiring a mandated
premium may deter some shareholders from crossing the 25% ownership level that
triggers a mandatory bid, who conceivably might have been more efficient corporate
monitors had they been able to obtain a controlling interest. Still, it protects the public

133. Poland uses a 33-1/3% ceiling, which is a more meaningful definition of actual de facto control; also,
this level corresponded to the amount assigned to the lead NIF in each privatized company. See Pistor, supra
note 7, at 37-38.
134. Ironically, the Czech law already limited any investment privatization fund to a 20% ownership of the
equity securities of any firm. See Coffee, supranote 37, at 121-22. But these rules were easily evaded, either by
using multiple funds run by the same investment manager or, ultimately, by deregistering as a fund and
becoming an unregulated holding company.
135. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Large Shareholders and CorporateControl, 94 J. POL. ECON.
461 (1988) (finding firm value in U.S. firms to be maximized when there is a large but noncontrolling
shareholder).
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minority from "rent-seeking" contests in which the participants are principally seeking to
realize the private benefits of control.
Predictably, some will object that this approach is inefficient because it chills the
market for corporate control and precludes some potentially efficient acquisitions. This
cost seems highly speculative, but it must in any event be balanced against the economic
and political externalities caused by rent-seeking control fights between contenders who
are primarily seeking to realize the private benefits of control. The Czech experience
suggests that the dispersed ownership created by voucher privatization encourages a
"winner-take-all" control fight in which the ultimate victor obtains a de facto right to
expropriate wealth from other shareholders. Under such circumstances, there is every
reason to expect that the contestants will utilize every weapon at their disposal including
bribery and corruption. Given these risks, the prudent course is to require the control
seeker to offer to acquire 100% of the stock and permit others to contest for control by
offering a higher bid. Such "high visibility" contests are preferable to "low visibility,"
"creeping control" contests in which the participants are likely to cut secret deals and
seek to use political influence.
VI. CONCLUSION

Why do common law systems outperform civil law systems in encouraging
dispersed ownership? To be assessed intelligently, this question must be broken down
into its components. Although the premise that different legal systems encourage
different patterns of ownership and different systems of governance seems valid, the truth
is that we do not yet fully comprehend the manner in which common law systems
provide superior protection for minority shareholders. Indeed, the answers may differ
widely among common law systems. Nonetheless, although no simple formula seems
likely to be discovered soon, a major part of the answer seems to lie not in the corporate
law of common law countries, but in their shared system of securities regulation.
Although the laws of the U.S. and the U.K. are far from identical, and each regulates
control contests quite differently, they each seek to discourage this type of rent-seeking
control contests that became endemic in the Czech Republic. The common elements of
the joint U.S./U.K. system of securities regulation-i.e., ownership transparency, high
disclosure standards, restrictions on "creeping control" acquisitions that preclude a
shareholder from assembling a controlling block without tendering for all shares, and
high listing standards-were at least partially present in Poland, but were originally
absent from the Czech Republic.
More generally, privatization has produced a conceptual mismatch: inherently, it
produces an initially dispersed ownership, but under a legal regime intended to
accommodate concentrated ownership. The result is necessarily short-lived. In this light,
law
the critique advanced by new students of comparative corporate governance that civil
136
Civil
systems fail to provide adequate minority protection needs to be re-formulated.
law systems may well protect minority shareholders against the forms of abuse long
known in systems of concentrated ownership (most typically, domination by a controlling
shareholder). But civil law systems do not address abuses that they have not witnessed

136. See sources cited supra notes 2 and 3.
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(such as the theft of the control premium in an exploitative partial takeover). Hence, they
leave public shareholders in a system of dispersed ownership exposed to a "winner-takeall" scramble for control, in which the losers can expect future expropriation by the
winner. Privatization, of course, creates just such a system of dispersed ownership
vulnerable to this form of abuse. More generally, the voting, proxy, and disclosure
systems under the German civil law approach do not contemplate that small shareholders
will play any active role. This premise may be valid in their environment, but when this
system is applied to privatized companies, it leaves small shareholders powerless and
thus helps to compel a transition to concentrated ownership. Rather than seeing this
transition as inevitable, policy planners must recognize that it is a contextual product of
the dominant forces in the legal and market environment. Phrased more generally,
because civil law systems of corporate govemance implicitly contemplate concentrated
ownership, they have disdained disclosure to the market for disclosure to the supervisory
board. In consequence, the civil law tends to inhibit the development of securities
markets, whose growth depends upon the breaking down of informational asymmetries.
Whether differences in judicial style and performance between common law and
civil law systems matter significantly for the success of privatization and the stability of
dispersed ownership seems more debatable. One problem with any such comparison is
that the presumed homogeneity of common law systems also seems suspect. The U.S.
and the U.K. have achieved functional convergence, but not formal convergence. The
effective absence of litigation remedies in the U.K. available to minority shareholders
suggests that the combination of high disclosure standards and an active, unconstrained
takeover market may constitute an effective functional substitute for litigation (or other
remedies that are more available in the U.S.). Legally, as much may separate the U.S. and
the U.K. as unites them.
To the extent that one is skeptical of the ability of the judiciary in transitional
economies to restrain opportunism, the natural policy response may be to recommend
reliance on "self-enforcing" remedies. 137 Indeed, the Polish NIFs may supply the best
feasible example of such a structural reform. Nonetheless, the idea that "self-enforcing"
remedies would prove sufficient by themselves has been shown to be overconfident. The
primary problem is that viable securities markets will not develop or persist in the
absence of some workable mechanism of regulatory enforcement. Fraud, manipulation,
insider trading-these practices became endemic in the Czech Republic (for at least a
period of time) under a legal system that was as laissez-faire oriented as has existed
anywhere in recent times. To develop liquid markets, regulation must overcome those
practices that will otherwise drive portfolio investors from the market. This does not
necessarily mean that U.S.-style class actions are necessary or that common law judges
must be imported into civil law jurisdictions (nor do such reforms seem feasible), but it
does suggest that other enforcement techniques (such as specialized courts and
administrative enforcement proceedings) need to be seriously explored.
Academic attitudes are changing today. Where not long ago concentrated ownership
was seen as efficient and dispersed ownership was taken by some to imply over-

137. For precisely this reason, Professors Black and Kraakman recommended use of "self-enforcing"
remedies. See Black and Kraakman, supra note 17, at 1925-27.
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regulation of institutional investors, 138 today concentrated ownership is now being
viewed by others as a measure of weak protection for minority shareholders. Predictably,
academic fashions will change again, but the critical issue is an applied one: how to
establish strong securities markets? Here the data from the aftermath of the Asian
financial crisis suggests that minority protection appears to be a139necessary, but not a
sufficient, condition to the emergence of viable securities markets.
The bottom line, as usual, is that those ignorant of history are destined to repeat it.
"Fast" privatization unaccompanied by minority protection and adequate disclosure
standards will produce expropriation and rent-seeking. To call this inevitable, however, is
only to claim that ignorance is inevitable.

138. See MARK ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE 233-34, 243-44 (1994).
139. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.

